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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this article is to review the Washington State
law of personal property security interests under the existing
1962 Text' of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.) adopted by the legislature in 19652 and to introduce the
reader to the substantive and procedural improvements adoption
bf the 1972 Text 3 would make in existing Washington practice.
This article advocates the approval of the 1972 Text at the next
session of the Washington Legislature. In addition, the article
proposes several nonuniform amendments and changes in
1. The Uniform Commerical Code is the product of collaboration between the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. It was begun in the 1940's as a project to harmonize state laws on commercial
transactions and has evolved through a number of drafts of Official Texts. The 1962 Official Text was adopted by the large majority of state legislatures between 1962 and 1966
and either is currently, or has been, in effect in 49 states.
2. Uniform Commercial Code, ch. 157, 1965 Wash. Laws 2333 (codified at WASH. REV.
CODE tit. 62A (1979)). Citations to the 1962 Text of the Uniform Commercial Code as
adopted in Washington are in the form, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 62A.9-102 (1979); citations to the 1972 amendments to the 1962 Text are cited as, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-102 (1972
version).
3. Even before the Uniform Commercial Code became the law in Washington on
July 1, 1967, an Article 9 Review Committee was already at work dealing with problems
which had surfaced in the legal literature and in the substantial U.C.C. case law from
those jurisdictions which had earlier enacted the Code. The committee's work resulted in
suggested revisions to the 1962 Text, which were promulgated in 1972 as a new Official
Text. The changes are directed at filling the gaps, correcting the errors, and resolving the
uncertainties in the 1962 Official Text.
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existing Washington nonuniform provisions, which would
improve the functioning of the personal property security system
in Washington, and which, therefore, should be considered by
the legislature in conjunction with the 1972 Text. These proposals include elimination of all special provisions in Article 9 relating to farm credit; extention of existing nonuniform subsection
9-204(6) to protect all cash sellers, not just sellers of livestock,
from loss of their goods to the buyer's inventory financier on dishonor of the buyer's check; and modification of the language of
the second paragraph of subsection 9-501(1) to prohibit a deficiency judgment against a consumer after repossession in all
cases of consumer purchase money financing, and not just in the
case of conditional sales. Finally, the article surveys the
interpretations of the existing text of Article 9 given by the
Washington Supreme Court and Court of Appeals in the approximately three dozen Washington appellate cases reported' in the
twelve years since the Code became effective in Washington and
discusses how these cases will be affected by the adoption of the
1972 Text.
By July, 1979, twenty-six states had adopted the 1972 Text,
including Oregon, Idaho, and California, and the leading commercial states of New York, Michigan, Illinois, and Texas. 5 Yet
through the end of the 1979 Extraordinary Session of the Washington Legislature, no bill to enact the 1972 Text in Washington
has ever been introduced. That the 1972 Text, which apparently
has generated no active opposition, is noncontroversial and
intended to make an already good law even better is an explanation, but not an excuse, for why the legislature has overlooked
the 1972 Text. For the very same reasons, it is not a cause that
generates vocal support, and even the Washington State Bar
Association appears not to have undertaken active sponsorship.
This article has been prepared in the hope that it will explain
the 1972 amendments to Article 9 in the context of the existing
Washington law. Its passage would not only improve Washington
4. A LEXIS computer search of Washington appellate cases reveals 37 opinions
through September, 1979, that cite one or more provisions of the Washington Text of
Article 9. In several of these, reference to Article 9 is incidental to the issues presented
and mention of these cases has been omitted in the article. A computer search revealed
no reported decisions from other states interpreting the Washington Text of Article 9
and one opinion each from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Washington.
5. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REPORTING SERVICE: STATE CORRELATION TABLES (Pike
& Fischer, Inc. ed. 1979 & Supp. 1980).

4 '

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 3:1

commercial law but also harmonize Washington law with that of
the majority of other states.

II.

THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE NINE

Under subsection 9-102(1)(a), Article 9 extends to transactions' well beyond what are normally thought of as security
interests.7 The Code expressly recognizes, for example, that a
transaction in the form of a lease may actually be a security
8
interest disguised in an effort to hide it from public view.
Because the rights of a lessor of personal property historically
have been enforced against a creditor of the lessee by an action
of replevin based upon the lessor's title, either at common law or
under modern statute a lease of personal property does not have
to be recorded to avoid conflict with the rules against fraudulent
6. The rules for the transactional scope of Article 9, contained in WASH. REV. CODE §
62A.9-102 (1979), remain unchanged from the 1962 to the 1972 Text. As noted in the
discussion of multistate transactions, a clause dealing with territorial choice of law has
been deleted from § 9-102 in the 1972 Text. See text accompanying notes 183-87 infra.
The significant issue relating to the transactional scope of Article 9, as with Article 2
on sales, is whether the principles of Article 9 may be applied by analogy to transactions
which bear functional similarities to those transactions covered by the Article. Washington and a number of other jurisdictions have extended Article 2 protections to cases not
involving sales. E.g., Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 92 Wash. 2d 40, 593 P.2d 1308 (1979);
Baker v. City of Seattle, 79 Wash. 2d 198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971). See generally Fransworth,
Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 653 (1957);
Comment, The Extension of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code to Leases of Goods,
12 TULSA L.J. 556 (1977). But extension of Article 2 warranties has been denied in other
cases. E.g., Aegis Prods., Inc. v. Arriflex Corp., 25 A.D.2d 639, 268 N.Y.S. 2d 185 (1966) (no
warranty on repair of personal property).
In Merchants Leasing Co. v. Clark, 14 Wash. App. 317, 540 P.2d 922 (1975), the
court of appeals raised on its own motion, but left undecided, the question of whether the
default provisions of Part 5 of Article 9 should be applicable to regulate the rights of
lessor and lessee under a long-term lease of personal property. That case involved a noncancellable five-year lease, which the lessee had an option to extend to a maximum of
eight years but, significantly, had no option to purchase. See WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.1201(37)(last sent.) (1979). The lessor sought to recover a deficiency judgment from the
lessee after the lessor had repossessed and sold the property without giving notice to the
lessee. The court decided the issue of the effect of lack of notice on the sale in the same
manner as similar U.C.C. cases had been decided in Washington, but without direct
application of the rules of Part 5 of Article 9. See Commercial Credit Corp. v. Wollgast,
11 Wash. App. 117, 521 P.2d 1191, pet. rev. denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1004 (1974); Grant
County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash. App. 866, 496 P.2d 966 (1972). For a discussion of
these cases, see notes 279-86 infra. Despite the invitation of the court of appeals in Clark
for future litigants to raise the application of Article 9 in non-Code cases, no subsequent
reported case appears to have dealt with this issue.
7. "Security interest" is defined in WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.1-201(37) (1979) as "an
interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an
obligation."
8. WASH. REv. CODE § 62A.1-201(37)(last sent.) (1979).
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conveyances. Thus, the lessor's right to recover his property from
the lessee's creditors creates, in fact, a secret, or unrecorded,
interest in what is ostensibly the lessee's property. To prevent
the public notice requirements imposed upon nonpossessory
security devices from being undercut, the Code, in subsection
1-201(37), sets out objective standards for judging whether a
lease is a true lease or shall be deemed to be a security interest
and thus subject to the provisions of Article 9.
Subsection 9-102(1)(b) also includes all sales of accounts
receivable within the scope of the Article.9 The Code recognizes
the functional similarity between the borrowing against and the
selling of accounts receivable in the financing of a businesso and
imposes upon the account buyer the same third-party notice
requirements under Article 9 as fall upon the account lender. In
doing so, the provision continues the practice begun by statutes
such as Washington's assignment of accounts receivable statute, I which mandated filing of notice to perfect assignments of
accounts. Under the earlier common law, a sale of accounts was
treated as merely a special case of the assignment of choses in
action, which required the creditor to notify the account debtor
in order to claim priority against subsequent purchasers."
Although such notification may be effective protection for the
account debtor against requests for payment by a later assignee,
it is not only a cumbersome method of perfection in large scale
financing, but also is frequently for business reasons objectionable. Thus, because of the need for providing adequate notice,
simplifying the procedure, and making information concerning
accounts receivable financing more easily accessible to third parties, the drafters followed the tendency of modern law by including all accounts transactions within Article 9 filing provisions.
9. Id. § 62A.9-102(1)(b) also includes within the scope of Article 9 sales of chattel
paper, a type of collateral first introduced by Article 9. See text accompanying notes 2526 infra.
10. See U.C.C. § 9-102, Official Comment 2 (1972 version). The Official Comments
are neither the law nor the reports of a legislative committee but rather the comments of
the drafters of the Article. Although they have no legal status, they are extremely helpful
to an understanding of the Code.
11. Ch. 8, §§ 1-12, 1947 Wash. Laws 20 (repealed 1966).
12. In Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943), the United States
Supreme Court cast doubt on accounts receivable financing by declaring the assignee's
interest vulnerable to the avoidance powers of the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy under
§ 60 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 unless the account debtors had been notified of the
assignment. Statutes such as Washington's were passed in response to the need for a
practical perfection technique, and § 60 was subsequently amended tobverrule the result
in Klauder. See 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1976) (repealed 1978) (repeal effective Oct. 1, 1979).

6
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CLASSIFICATION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY

The methods required for perfection against the claim of
third parties of a secured party's rights in the debtor's property
3
vary according to the kind of property, or collateral,' involved.
Also, if the filing of a financial statement is the required method
of perfection, the place where filing is required may vary depending on the nature of the collateral subject to the security interest. In addition, with certain kinds of collateral third parties can
obtain rights that will defeat even a perfected security interest.
Hence, an accurate classification of the collateral is essential.
A.

Goods

Collateral can be categorized as either tangible personal
15
property (goods)" or intangible property. Goods are further subdivided in section 9-109 according to their use by the debtor. The
four classifications of goods are consumer goods, equipment,
farm products, and inventory. Inventory includes not only raw
materials and products held for sale, but also property held for
lease." Equipment is property used in a business; it also forms
the residual category for all goods that do not fit within any of
the other three categories."
The proper classification of goods, under the definitions in
section 9-109, depends upon their use by the debtor granting the
security interest, and the method of perfection (i.e., whether
filing is required or not, and if so, where) depends upon the classification. Problems with respect to perfection can arise when the
debtor's use of the goods changes after the security interest is
properly perfected according to the rules relating to the debtor's
original use. Will the new use require a new filing? Subsection
9-401(3) attempts to meet this difficulty by declaring that a
security interest properly perfected by filing according to the
debtor's original use remains perfected even though a change in
5
use might demand filing in a different location."
13. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-302(1) (1979).
14. U.C.C. § 9-105(h) (1972 version).
15. See text accompanying notes 24-34 infra.
16. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-109(4) (1979).
17. Id. § 62A.9-109(2).
18. Washington has adopted this alternative of § 9-401(3). The other proposed alternative would continue perfection by a correct original filing for only four months after the
change in use, after which time the interest would become unperfected unless a filing
proper for the new use was made. U.C.C. § 9-401(3), Alternative Subsection (1972 version). The rule of § 9-401(3) is necessitated by the filing location rules of § 9-401(1).
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Further difficulties arise if the debtor makes representation
to a purchase money lender as to his intended use and immediately upon receipt of the collateral subjects it to a different use.
Will the objective manifestations of the debtor's intent or the
debtor's subjective intent control the classification of the goods?
The Washington Supreme Court has recognized in dicta in Com0
mercial Credit Equipment Corp. v. Carter,"
that such problems
may exist but has expressly reserved the question whether the
creditor may rely on such representations in determining classification for perfection purposes.
In addition to belonging to one of these four categories,
goods may also be fixtures, i.e., while retaining their character as
personal property they are sufficiently attached to real estate
that an interest in them may be acquired under the law of real
property." Because of this overlap between real and personal
property law, the U.C.C. contains provisions requiring the filing
of claims to personal property interests in fixtures in the real
property recording system. The Code also regulates the relative
rights of creditors whose conflicting claims to the same fixtures
arise from real property law on the one hand, and from personal
property law on the other."'
One particular facet of the 1972 definition of goods may substantially affect Washington practice. Subsection 9-105(h) of the
1972 Text adds standing timber "which is to be cut and removed
under a conveyance or contract for sale" to the list of goods in
which a personal property security interest may be created. This
Washington adopted Alternative 2 of § 9-401(1), which provides for filing at the county
level for interests in farm products and consumer goods and filing in a central index
under the control of the Secretary of State for interests in equipment and inventory.
Hence, a change in use from consumer goods to equipment, or vice versa, would render a
correct original filing incorrect if measured by the new use.
WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-401(3) (1979) does not resolve the problem of continued
perfection if the goods originally were used as consumer goods and the security interest
was created as a purchase money interest in the goods, perfected without filing (as permitted by id. § 62A.9-302(1)(d)) and, thereafter, the use is changed, for example, to
equipment.
19. 83 Wash. 2d 136, 516 P.2d 767 (1973). In this case, the use of the goods determined the legal effects of the relationship between the parties, rather than the proper
manner of perfection. The question was whether a deficiency judgment after repossession
of the collateral upon default would be allowed under WASH. Rv. CODE § 62A.9-501(1)
(1979). The court held that the initial use fixed the nature of the parties' agreement, but
it did not differentiate clearly between use determining rights inter partes and use determining duties to third parties. For further discussion of the case, see text accompanying
notes 227-28 infra.
20. U.C.C. § 9-313(1)(a) (1972 version).
21. WASH. Rav. CODE § 62A.9-313 (1979).

8
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B.

Intangibles

The 1972 Code defines five kinds of intangible collateral.
Two of these are claims the law has come to view as embodied in
paper of particular form. The first kind, collectively defined as
instruments in subsection 9-105(1)(i), includes negotiable instruments and investment securities, the subject matter of Articles 3
and 8, respectively. The second kind consists of documents of
title, which are the subject matter of Article 7. To protect rights
granted by these Articles to the party-in-possession against
adverse claimants, Article 9 restricts claims to a security interest
in these kinds of intangibles by anyone other than the person in
possession of the paper that evidences the chose.2"
A third type of intangible collateral is chattel paper. This
concept, introduced for the first time in Article 9, relates to the
practice of a lender financing his debtor, a merchant of goods, by
accepting as collateral a combination of the merchant's security
interest in, and the buyer's promise to pay for, goods the
merchant sells on credit. Chattel paper is thus a combination of
a security interest in goods together with the buyer's payment
obligation.25 Chattel paper is significant particularly as proceeds
of the sale of higher value consumer goods, in which sales on
open account (i.e., on the buyer's unsecured promise to pay) are
not often made. The lender who takes chattel paper as collateral
is thus obtaining two-tiered protection against loss should his
borrower, the seller, not repay the advance. First, he has the
promise of the buyer to pay for the goods he has purchased, and
second, he has the further protection of the security interest the
buyer has created in the goods themselves. Chattel paper financing may occur by virtue of a financier's purchase of, or lending
on, the chattel paper as collateral for an original loan or by virtue of an inventory lender's taking an interest in chattel paper as
proceeds. Although Article 9 permits a security interest in chat24. Id. §§ 62A.9-308-.9-309.
25. Id. § 62A.9-105(1)(b). Chattel paper may also consist of a lease of specific goods
and the lessee's obligation to pay rent. Id. § 62A.9-105(b). Chattel paper of this nature
arises when a lessor assigns to his lender his rights in a lease as security for an advance
used to finance the purchase of the leased goods. Perfecting an interest in chattel
paper
taken from a lessor presents difficulty under both the 1962 and 1972 Texts, as illustrated
by In re Leasing Consultants, 486 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1973). The financier should
always
file a financing statement against the lessor, naming the leased goods as collateral,
in
addition to perfecting his interest in the chattel paper itself. In this manner, the financier
is
perfected in the residual rights of the lessor in the goods and also is protected in the event
of
the lessor's bankruptcy.
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tel paper to be perfected either by filing against the papbr or by
possession, the Code indicates a preference for possessory security interests."6
The fourth and fifth kinds of intangible collateral, accounts
and general intangibles, are not' rights the law considers to be
embodied in any particular writing but are merely choses in
action. Section 9-106 of the 1972 Text defines an account as a
promise to pay arising out of a contract for the sale or lease of
goods or the performance of services. General intangible is the
residual category of personal property (other than money) not
included in the definition of goods or the other four kinds of
intangibles. The only significant differences in the treatment of
accounts and general intangibles are that a sale of general
intangibles is not a transaction within the scope of Article 9,
"7
while a sale of accounts is. Also, a security interest in general
intangibles must always be perfected by filing, while a security
interest in accounts "which does not alone or in conjunction with
other assignments to the same assignee transfer a significant
part of the outstanding accounts of the assignor" is perfected
statement.2
automatically without the need to file a financing
Because in some cases it may be difficult to differentiate
between accounts and general intangibles, a sound rule of thumb
is to file a financing statement to evidence every assignment of a
chose in action not clearly and explicitly excluded from the
scope of Article 9 by section 9-104 or subsection 9-302(3)."9
26. Chattel paper financing is not for the unsophisticated. In addition to perfecting
secuhis own interest in the chattel paper, the financier must verify that the component
seller, has
the
transferor,
his
to
buyer
the
by
granted
goods
underlying
the
in
interest
rity
a
itself been properly perfected by filing against the buyer; also the lender must file
financing statement to perfect his interest in the merchant's residual claims to the underlying goods as against the merchant's other creditors should the goods be repossessed or
otherwise returned to the merchant's possession. See note 25 supra.
27. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-102(1)(b) (1979). See text accompanying notes 9-12
supra.
28. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-302(1)(e) (1979).
29. Section 9-104 lists specific transactions excluded from the scope of Article 9, and
must
§ 9-302(3) eliminates the need for a U.C.C. filing when evidence of an assignment
be recorded in some other existing registration system set up under federal or state law,
as in the case of copyrights. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 408 (1976). The distinction between an
account and a general intangible proved the difference between a perfected and an
unperfected security interest in Friedman, Lobe & Block v. C.L.W. Corp., 9 Wash. App.
319, 512 P.2d 769 (1973). The secured party took an assignment of the right to recover in
a cause of action brought by his assignor against a third party as security for a loan but
had not filed a financing statement when a creditor of the assignor levied on the action.
The court of appeals awarded the collateral to the levying creditor because the assign(1979)
ment was of a general intangible, to which WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-302(1)(e)
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Under the 1972 definition of account, it makes no difference
whether the contract giving rise to the promise to pay has been
performed. The 1962 Text, however, differentiates between rights
arising out of executory contracts and rights that are unconditionally due because the counterperformance has been rendered. ": ' All rights to payment in cases where the counterperformance is still due are defined under section 9-106 of the
1962 Text as contract rights. If the contract right arises out of an
executory contract for the sale or lease of goods or for the performance of services, the contract right matures into an account
when the performance is rendered. But if the contract right
arises under any other executory contract (for example, rights
to rental payments from an executory lease of real estate), the
contract right matures into a general intangible.
This divergence upon maturity of contract rights leads to a
potential trap for the unwary secured creditor under the 1962
Text. First, no security interest is conferred if the collateral is
not specifically covered in the written agreement.3 ' The creditor
claiming security in contract rights might fail to include the
words accounts or general intangibles in the description of his
collateral and therefore lose his security if the contract rights
matured while his advance was still outstanding. Second, in the
case of a debtor with business locations in more than one state, a
perfected security interest in contract rights might become
unperfected upon the maturity of the contract right into a general intangible, unless filing of the financing statement had been
accomplished in more than one state."2 The category of contract
rights has been abolished and the definition of accounts broadened in the 1972 Text to eliminate these problems.
Another important definition of Part 1 is that of the
does not apply, and, therefore, the assignment was unperfected.
For the meaning of § 9- 3 02(1)(e)'s phrase "significant part of the outstanding
accounts of the assignor," see note 79 infra.
30. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-106 (1976) with U.C.C. § 9-106 (1972
version).
31. For discussion of attachment under § 9-203, see text accompanying notes 37-38
infra.
32. See WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-103(1), (2) (1979). Under these provisions, interests in contract rights and accounts are perfected by filing in the state where the debtor
keeps his records concerning them; general intangibles are perfected, in contrast, in the
state where the debtor has his chief place of business. If these are located in two different
states, multiple filings are required. Since it is sometimes difficult to tell where these
locations are, problems under these provisions can be compounded, defeating even the
creditor who had tried to comply with § 9-103(1) and (2). For a discussion of multistate
transactions, see text accompanying notes 183-220 infra.
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purchase money security interest in section 9-107. This definition
relates to the circumstances under which a security interest is
created rather than to the kind of collateral involved. As in preCode law, 33 Article 9 recognizes special rights of a seller of property who delivers on credit and retains a security interest in the
property to insure payment of the purchase price. Under common law the seller's rights were based upon his reservation of
title, notwithstanding the fact his rights constituted a secret
interest in goods in his debtor's possession. Under present law
the seller's claim is treated as is any other security interest in
terms of perfection requirements, but his priority over the
buyer's other creditors in the goods that he has supplied is preserved in the U.C.C. The justification is that the seller has
furnished to the debtor's estate the value to which he makes his
claim, so that to recognize his interest is not to diminish assets
otherwise available to other creditors.
With reservation of title no longer the basis for recognizing
the seller's favored status in the property transferred to the
buyer, the significant departure of section 9-107 from prior law is
easily explained. For the first time, the definition of purchase
money security interest includes an interest taken by a lender of
the purchase price of the collateral which secures the lender's
interest. Of course, as stated in the definition itself, the lender's
interest is a purchase money interest only if the lender's advance
is so used. To protect themselves, lenders who plan to take a
purchase money interest frequently arrange to make the advance
by means of payment directly to the seller.
IV.

CREATING AN ENFORCEABLE SECURITY INTEREST

A.

The Contract Aspects-Attachment

A security interest combines a contract allowing a secured
party to seek satisfaction out of the collateral upon a debtor's
default with a property right enabling the secured party to
enforce his claims in the collateral against the debtor's other
creditors. Part 2 of Article 9 regulates the "contract" aspect of
security interests.
Subsection 9-203(1) of the 1972 Text states three conditions
33. See, e.g, Conditional Sales and Leases of Personal Property, ch. 106, 1893 Wash.
Laws 253 (repealed 1965).
34. See generally Starr, Conditional Sales and Chattel Mortgages, 9 WASH. L. REv.
143 (1934).
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which must be fulfilled before an enforceable security interest
can arise: (1) a written agreement signed by the debtor containing a description of the collateral, or, alternatively, an agreement
accompanied by delivery of the collateral to the secured party or
his agent; (2) an advance of value by the secured party; and (3)
acquisition of rights in the collateral by the debtor. When all
conditions have been met, the security interest is said to have
"attached" to the collateral.
When the debtor, as opposed to the creditor,3 6 retains possession of the collateral, the parties must execute a written
agreement. Official Comment 5 to section 9-203 states that the
requirement of a writing should be interpreted as a statute of
frauds. Courts faced with the question of validating a nonpossessory security interest have nearly unanimously held no enforceable security interest exists when the creditor could not produce
a signed writing containing language granting the creditor an
interest in the collateral.17 Some creditors have attempted unsuccessfully to substitute for a security agreement a properly filed
financing statement.3 8 Many courts have rejected such a substitution on the ground that the form developed for filing as
required in section 9-402 does not contain language of agreement, notwithstanding the presence of a description of the collateral and the debtor's signature. 9 Such cases, however,
overzealously apply the requirement of a writing as a precondit.ion of enforceability; a public memorandum reciting the collateral and signed by the debtor should be adequate evidence of
35. U.C.C. § 9-203(2) (1972 version). The 1972 Text of §§ 9-203 and 9-204 varies
from the 1962 Text both in arrangement and in substantive content. Under the 1962 Text
a security interest will attach on oral agreement, WASH. REv. CODE § 62A.9-204(1) (1979),
but will not be enforceable unless the statute of frauds contained in § 9-203(1), requiring
a written instrument or delivery of possession of the collateral to the secured party, is
satisfied. The 1972 Text in effect merges the concepts of attachment and enforceability.
36. When a security agreement is accompanied by delivery of the collateral to the
secured party, the need for evidence of the agreement is satisfied by the secured party's
possession of the collateral itself. WASH. REv. CODE § 62A.9-203(1)(a) (1979).
37. In Warren Tool Co. v. Stephenson, 11 Mich. App. 274, 161 N.W.2d 133 (1968),
the Michigan Court of Appeals held the doctrine of equitable lien was alive and well in
Michigan, despite the passage of the U.C.C. some four years earlier. The court validated
the security interest despite the absence of any written agreement. Id. at 301-03, 161
N.W.2d at 148-49. The holding in this case appears to remain a minority of one. See
U.C.C. § 9-203, Official Comment 5 (1972 version).
38. See, e.g., American Card Co. v. H. M. H. Co., 97 R.I. 59, 196 A.2d 150 (1963).
For a discussion of such cases, see 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 11.4 (1965).
39. See, e.g., General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Bankers Comm. Corp., 244 Ark. 984, 429
S.W.2d 60 (1968).
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agreement between the parties.40
Under Washington case law, a certificate of title application
can qualify as a written agreement under subsection 9-203(1) in
certain situations. In Kreiger v. Hartig,' the creditor claimed a
nonpossessory security interest in a vehicle pursuant to an oral
security agreement and produced a title certificate showing the
record of her lien on its face.42 Upon the debtor's objection to the
interest's enforceability, the Washington Court of Appeals held
that the applicationfor issuance of a new title certificate bearing
the lien, which by statute was required to contain both the
debtor's signature and a description of the vehicle, constituted a
writing satisfying subsection 9-203(1). The court specifically
rejected the assertion that the signed statement was insufficient
3
because it contained no words granting a security interest. Certainly this decision is more within the intent and fair construction of the Code."
The Code contains in Article 1 a complex definition of value,
the second condition of enforceability. In addition to delivery of
money or an extension of credit contemporaneous with the creation of the security interest, this definition includes the cancellation of a preexisting indebtedness, a binding obligation by the
secured party to extend future credit, or any promise or act by
the secured party which would form consideration for a simple
contract. 5
The third condition, that the debtor have rights in the collateral, is satisfied immediately if the property already belongs
to the debtor at the time the agreement is made. In many cases,
however, a security agreement is signed in anticipation of the
debtor receiving the property that is to serve as collateral. Such
40. See, e.g., Evans v. Everett, 279 N.C. 352, 183 S.E.2d 109 (1971).
41. 11 Wash. App. 898, 527 P.2d 483 (1974).
42. The Washington Text does not require the filing of a financing statement in collateral, such as motor vehicles, for which a lien may be recorded on the face of a title
certificate. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-302(3) (1979). For example, Washington law provides for issuance of motor vehicle title certificates and for recording liens on the face of
such certificates. Id. ch. 46.12.
43.
[Wihether any particular writing was intended to create or provide for
a security interest is . . . a question of fact. In view of the Code's general policy to avoid technical formalities, we hold that the evidence permitted the trial
judge to find Hartig's written application for transfer of title to Kreiger was
sufficient to "create" a security interest in compliance with the requirements of
section 9-203.
11 Wash. App. at 902, 527 P.2d at 486.
44. See WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.1-102(1) (1979).
45. Id. § 62A.1-201(44).
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is usually the case with a purchase money security interest, in
which arrangements are made between the prospective buyer
and either the seller or lender for a security interest prior to the
completion of the sale and delivery of the collateral to the buyerdebtor." This will always be the case in inventory or accounts
receivable financing in which the security interest is intended to
cover inventory not yet acquired or accounts not yet created
("floating lien")."
B.

After-Acquired Property Clauses

One difficulty with earlier statutes dealing with security
interests in personal property was that they did not explicitly
recognize the validity of clauses purporting to create a security
interest in collateral not yet belonging to the debtor. If the validity of a security interest in subsequently acquired property could
not be assured, a financier of inventory or accounts receivable
would be required to enter into a new agreement (and to file a
new notice) with each shipment of inventory acquired by the
debtor and with each account created by the debtor, or risk loss
of his security interest upon attack by the debtor's other creditors. Section 9-204 specifically recognizes the validity of clauses
extending the security interest to property first acquired by the
debtor subsequent to the execution of the agreement,4" subject
only to an exception for consumer goods."9 This section makes
possible inventory and accounts receivable financing arrangements where the security interest will continue to attach to subsequently acquired inventory or subsequently created accounts
without requiring either a new agreement or new steps to perfect.
The 1972 Text of section 9-204 eliminates subsections
9-204(2) and 9-204(4)(a) of the 1962 Text, a series of confusing
provisions purporting to indicate when a security intrest can first
attach to certain kinds of property. In each case the drafters of the
1962 Text are reminding the reader that the collateral mentioned
is either not yet personal property (e.g., oil, gas, minerals in the
46. If the collateral consists of goods to be acquired in a contract of sale, Article 2
gives the buyer a "special property" in goods even prior to their delivery or to the acquisition of title by the buyer. Id. § 62A.2-501. This special property is sufficient for the
attachment of a security interest. See Rex Fin'l, Corp. v. Mobile America Corp., 119
Ariz. 176, 580 P.2d 8 (Ct. App. 1978) (a purchase money security interest attached upon
the buyer's signing of a binding purchase agreement, even though buyer had not taken
delivery).
48. WASH. RIv. CODE § 62A.9-204(3) (1979).
49. Id. § 62A.9-204(4)(b).
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ground, uncut timber) or not yet property at all (e.g., unplanted
crops, unconceived animals, uncaught fish, an accord before the
contract creating it is signed). Realizing that effective rules on
borderline situations cannot be easily drawn by the legislature, the
drafters of the 1972 amendments wisely left to the courts the
matter of determining when a security interest can first attach.
The Washington Text of section 9-204, which otherwise conforms to the Official 1962 Text, was amended in 1974 to include
50
a nonuniform subsection (6). That subsection prevents attachment (and therefore perfection under section 9-303) of an inventory financier's security interest to livestock or meat products
purchased by a packer or similar person for a period of up to ten
days after they have been sold to a debtor who pays by check.
Obviously inspired by the litigation culminating in the 1974
United States Supreme Court decision in Mahon v. Stowers,"'
subsection 9-204(6) is clearly intended to permit a cattleman to
accept a check from his purchaser and be assured of protection
against the lien of the buyer's inventory financier should the
buyer's check bounce. Article 2 provides limited but inadequate
relief for sellers who deliver their goods to a buyer prior to receiving full cash settlement. The seller's right to reclaim his goods
within ten days after delivery upon discovery that his buyer is
insolvent under subsection 2-702(2) in case of a credit sale, and
the seller's parallel right to reclaim within ten days of delivery
52
upon dishonor of a check given for payment in a cash sale, are
50. This nonuniform section reads:
A security interest cannot attach to livestock or to meat or meat products made
from such livestock, where (a) the livestock was sold to the debtor by another
party, (b) this other party has been paid by draft or check, and (c) the draft or
check remains outstanding; Provided, That a security interest may attach
when the draft or check has been outstanding more than ten days.
Id. § 62A.9-204(6).
a
51. 416 U.S. 100 (1974). Livestock sellers took checks on delivery of their cattle to
apparently
checks,
the
before
petition
XI
Chapter
a
Texas meat packer, who filed
promptly presented, were paid. Both the bankruptcy trustee and the packer's inventory
financier opposed the cattlemen's petition to reclaim. The final disposition on remand to
the court of appeals was that the selling cattlemen lost to the inventory financier pursuant to the Texas U.C.C. In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'g en
banc 510 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1975).
52. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-702(2) (1979) specifically grants the credit seller 10
the
days to reclaim after delivery, but no provision expressly creates a parallel right for
presumably
is
right
seller's
cash
The
bounces.
later
which
check
a
accepts
who
cash seller
granted by § 2-507(2): "Where payment is due and demanded on the delivery to the
buyer of goods or documents of title, his right as against the seller to retain or dispose of
them is conditional upon his making the payment due." Official Comment 3 to § 2-507(2)
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defeated by a good faith purchaser from the buyer. 53 Because the
definition of "purchase" in subsection 1-201(32) includes taking
by "mortgage, . . . lien, . . . or any other voluntary transaction
creating an interest in property," the packer's inventory
financier, relying on an after-acquired property clause, would
defeat the cattleman attempting to reclaim his property on dishonor of the check. New subsection 9-204(6) will prevent the
financier from establishing a superior claim if the cattleman
moves with diligence to recover his goods upon promptly
presenting the check and discovering its dishonor. 5'
The protection afforded the cattleman in subsection 9-204(6)
should be extended to all cash sellers of goods who accept a
check as conditional payment, and perhaps to credit sellers. As
to the former, certainly there is no intent to offer any credit to
the buyer, the seller believing the instrument he is receiving will
be honored. Consequently, no apparent reason exists for a seller
concludes with the statement: "The provision of this Article for a ten day limit within
which the seller may reclaim goods delivered on credit to an insolvent buyer is also applicable here." Section 2-511(3) states in addition that "payment by check is conditional
and is defeated as between the parties by dishonor of the check on due presentment."
53. Id. § 62A.2-702(3).
54. In Mahon the seller's efforts to reclaim were opposed not only by the inventory
financier but also by the buyer's bankruptcy trustee. Obviously, the question whether the
inventory financier prevails is a matter within the Code; the conflict between the trustee
and the reclaiming seller, however, can only be settled under bankruptcy law. The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals has been the leader in vindicating the rights of the seller who
reclaims within § 2-702(2) against the trustee of the buyer. In In re Mel Golde Shoes,
Inc., 403 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1968), the Sixth Circuit held that the rights of the reclaiming
seller were superior to those of the bankruptcy trustee claiming as a lien creditor under §
70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act. In In re Federal's Inc., 553 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1977), the
court described the seller's § 2-702(2) rights as a "state-created right of ownership," id.
at 516, and not a statutory lien arising at bankruptcy. The court held the seller immune
from the bankruptcy trustee's attack under § 67(c)(1)(A), as well as under § 70(c), of the
1898 Bankruptcy Act. Id. Finally, in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 Congress has
resolved the controversy in favor of the seller by inclusion of § 546(c):
(c) The rights and powers of the trustee under sections 544(a), 545, 547,
and 549 of this title are subject to any statutory right or common law right of a
seller, in the ordinary course of such seller's business, of goods to the debtor to
reclaim such goods if the debtor has received such goods while insolvent, but(1) such a seller may not reclaim any such goods unless such seller
demands in writing reclamation of such goods before ten days after receipt of
such goods by the debtor; and
(2) the court may deny reclamation to a seller with such a right of reclamation that has made such a demand only if court(A) grants the claim of such a seller priority as an administrative expense; or
(B) secures such claim by a lien.
11 U.S.C.A. § 546(c) (West 1979).
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receiving a check to cover himself by reserving a security interest
in the goods he is delivering. 5 As to the latter, an after-acquired
property clause should not be allowed to enrich a financier who
has not, during the ten-day reclamation period afforded under
section 2-702(2), extended new value in reliance upon the
debtor's acquisition of the seller's goods. Therefore, at a minimum, when the 1972 amendments are considered, the legislature
should amend subsection (6) to read:
A security interest claimed in the debtor's inventory by way of
an after-acquired property clause cannot attach to goods sold
by another party to the debtor, or to their traceable proceeds, if
the debtor has paid the other party by draft, until ten days
after delivery of the goods to the debtor, or payment of the
draft by the drawee, whichever first occurs.
Such language would offer the cash seller taking a check during
the ten days after delivery complete protection from all security
interests except one created for new value within the ten-day
term ."
V.

A.

PERFECTION

The Requirement of Perfection

Once a security interest has attached, it is valid and
57
enforceable against the debtor. Section 9-201 confirms that a
55. Any such Article 9 interest reserved would, of course, be prior to that of the
existing financier, provided the seller followed the requirements of § 9-312(3) relating to
purchase money security interests in inventory.
56. Alternatively, if the legislature decided to extend protection to the reclaiming
credit seller acting under § 2-702, as well as to the reclaiming cash seller, such could be
accomplished by deleting WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-204(6) (1979) entirely and by amending
id. § 62A.2-207(3) to read:
the seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2), as well as the seller's
right to reclaim under § 2.507(2) is subject to the rights of a buyer in ordinary
course or other good faith purchaser under this Article (Section 2-403) who
extends new value to the buyer subsequent to the buyer's receipt of the seller's
goods.
(new language in italics).
57. Id. § 62A.9-201. A recent case involving §§ 9-201 and 9-203(1) presents the not
unusual situation of a real estate broker improperly preparing documents in a sale in
which he was acting as agent. The Washington Court of Appeals confirmed the buyer's
unencumbered title to the personal property transferred pursuant to the sale of a business on credit when the seller's agent failed to prepare a proper security agreement covering the personal property. Hecomovich v. Nielsen, 10 Wash. App. 563, 518 P.2d 1081
(1974). The court, however, awarded the seller damages against the escrow agent based
on the "value of the loss of the security interest" caused by its negligence. Id. at 573, 518
P.2d at 1088.
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security agreement is a contract between the debtor and the
secured party enforceable according to its terms upon the
debtor's default. This section further provides that a security
agreement is valid according to its terms against third parties
except as otherwise provided in Article 9. Notwithstanding this
language, with few exceptions, in order to afford any meaningful
protection against third parties, a security interest must be perfected. In particular, an unperfected security interest is subject
to defeat by a creditor who obtains a lien on the collateral by
judicial process (the "lien creditor rule")"; any conflicting
secured creditor who obtains a security interest in the same collateral and perfects, whether before or after the unperfected
security interest attaches;" and certain buyers and transferees10
Significantly, under federal bankruptcy law the bankruptcy trustee is granted the powers of a judicial lien creditor as of the date
of the debtor's bankruptcy' and consequently can use section
9-301 to defeat security interests not perfected at that date.
In the 1962 Text of subsection 9-301(1)(b) an important
exception exists to the lien creditor rule: the intervening lien
creditor must be without actual knowledge of the unperfected
58. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-301(3) (1979). Section 9-301(3) contains a definition of
lien creditor that includes an assignee for the benefit of creditors. Prior to the adoption of
the U.C.C., such assignees, who by the voluntary action of an insolvent debtor are liquidators appointed under state law for the benefit of general creditors, had no greater right
to the debtor's property against adverse claimants than did the debtor himself. Under
the U.C.C., however, the clear intent is that a general assignee shall prevail in the
debtor's property over interests unperfected at the time of the assignee's appointment.
The U.C.C., however, does not contain a definition of assignee for the benefit of creditors.
The question arises whether the language of § 9-301(3) was meant to include other liquidators appointed under state law, namely receivers appointed by petition of the debtor's
creditors. Professor Shattuck assumes without discussion that such is the case. Shattuck,
Secured Transactions (Other Than Real Estate Mortgages)-A Comparison of Article 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Pre-Code Washington Law, in COLLECTED
ESSAYS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE IN WASHINGTON 638, 688 (1967). In Morse
Electro Prods. Corp. v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Co., 90 Wash. 2d 195, 579 P.2d 1341 (1978),
the supreme court had the opportunity to resolve this question but apparently failed to
recognize the issue. The court, citing Western Elec. Co. v. Norway Pac. Constr. & Drydock Co., 124 Wash. 49, 213 P. 686 (1923), merely reiterated pre-Code law that "the
receiver stands in the shoes of the insolent." 90 Wash. 2d at 198, 579 P.2d at 1342. Had
the court instead determined that a receiver comes within the definition of a lien creditor, the losing claimant (an assignee of the receiver's rights to the fund in issue and an
unperfected secured party) may well have prevailed because the court assumed the winning party perfected its security interest subsequent to the date of the receiver's
appointment.
59. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 62A.9-301(a), .9-312(5) (1979).
60. Id. § 62A.9-301(1)(c), (d).
61. 11 U.S.C.A. § 544(a) (West 1979) (repealing 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1976)).
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security interest to prevail. This provision, inconsistent with the
pure "race" rules of section 9-312 relating to priority among
competing security interests in which knowledge plays no role,
injects an element of factual uncertainty into an otherwise6 2predictable priority scheme and was deleted in the 1972 Text.
The 1972 Text eliminates another troublesome provision of
the 1962 Text of section 9-301, the final sentence of subsection
9-301(3). This sentence appears to impute to the trustee of a
bankrupt debtor actual knowledge of an unperfected security
interest if all lien creditors have such knowledge at the date of
bankruptcy. Some commentators have observed that it is
provision is valid against the trustee
extremely doubtful that this
63
Act.
Bankruptcy
the
under
New subsection 9-301(4) resolves another question unanswered in the original text-priority between the lien of a levying
creditor and a perfected secured party's interest for advances
made after the levy on the collateral has been accomplished.
Will the levy terminate the secured party's claim to priority in
the collateral for the value of any advances subsequent to the
levy, or will the initial filing guarantee priority over conflicting
creditors for all advances thereafter made? Subsection 9-301(4)
of the 1972 Text grants the perfected secured party absolute priority for all advances made during the first forty-five days after a
competing levy is made and continued priority thereafter for
advances made in ignorance of the lien or pursuant to a preexisting contractual commitment. Priority for the secured party over
a later judicial lien creditor has been granted by virtually all
4
judicial decisions under the 1962 Text, but the need for statutory clarification remains acute as a result of the 1966 Internal
Revenue Code amendments 5 governing priority conflicts
between a properly filed federal tax lien and advances under an
earlier filed security interest. Under these amendments, an
62. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1972 version).
63. E.g., S. RIESENFELD, CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 501 (2d ed.
1975). Also,'under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 it is doubtful whether WASH. REV.
CODE § 62A.9-301 (3) (final sent.) (1979), is valid against the bankruptcy trustee. See 11
U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(4)(B)(ii) (West 1979).
64. E.g., Friedlander v. Adelphi Mfg. Co., 5 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1968). The secured party also prevailed in the absence of a subsequent advance clause,
where the advance was made while the debtor was still in debt and there was no change
in the collateral. In re Merriman, 4 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 234 (S.D. Ohio 1967). Virtually all
decisions agree with the Merriman result, the only contrary result coming in Coin-OMatic v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 3 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1112 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1966).
65. Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719,80 Stat. 1125 (Current version at
I.R.C. § 6323 (b)-(d)).
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advance within a forty-five day period after filing of the tax lien
will have priority over the tax lien if the advance would enjoy
priority under state law over a lien creditor levying on the collateral at the same instant the tax lien is recorded." Until a definitive state statutory rule is adopted, the threat remains that the
federal tax lien may be held to have priority.
B.

The Manner of Perfection

Perfection is not defined in Article 9, but subsection 9-303(1)
states in somewhat circular terms:
A security interest is perfected when it has attached and when
all of the applicable steps required for perfection have been
taken. Such steps are specified in Sections 9-302, 9-304, 9-305
and 9-306. If such steps are taken before the security interest
attaches, it is perfected at the time when it attaches."7
The steps referred to are those necessary to give third-party
notice. This third-party notice is what turns the security interest
from being little more than a contract right into a property right
enforceable against most third-party claimants. The Code provides for two methods of notice: creditor possession of the collateral or filing in a public register a financing statement containing
prescribed information about the security interest. In certain
limited but rather important cases, however, a third party will
not have notice because the Code allows for perfection of certain
security interests without filing or taking possession."
Part 4 of Article 9 regulates the location of filing, contents of
the financing statement, and other particulars surrounding the
filing system. Most importantly, section 9-402 states what information the financing statement must contain, and section 9-401
states where it must be filed. The philosophy is one of simplicity,
so that a good faith effort on the part of a secured creditor to
comply will enhance the likelihood of successfully perfecting his
interest. The contents prescribed by the 1962 Text of section
9-401 for the financing statement are names, addresses, and
signatures of the debtor and secured party and a description of the
collateral covered." The 1972 Text dropped the requirement of the
66. For discussion of %he effect of the 1966 amendments to the I.R.C., see Texas Oil
& Gas Corp. v. United States, 466 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1972).
67. WASH. REv. CODE § 62A.9-303(1) (1979).
68. See text accompanying notes 79-83 infra.
69. In the case of a fixture filing, § 9-402 requires certain additional information
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secured party's signature, which served no substantive purpose
and posed a trap for the unwary party who accidentally omitted it.
Because security interests are indexed by debtor's name, it
is essential that the debtor's name be accurately stated. An
incorrect debtor's name will cause a third person searching the
record to miss security interests in that particular debtor's property; consequently, filing under an incorrect name will result in
lack of perfection and probable loss of the collateral to competing claimants. Under the 1962 Code, however, there is no standard for determining the debtor's "correct" name-should one
file under the debtor's legal name or trade name or must one file
under both to be perfected? 0 Subsection 9-402(7) of the 1972
concerning the description and ownership of the real estate where the goods are located
so the fixture filing can be properly indexed in the real property records system. The
information requirements are not clearly spelled out in the 1962 Text. WASH. REV. CODE §
62A.9-402 (1979). The 1972 Text of § 9-402(5) clarifies precisely what information must
be furnished for a fixture filing. For a discussion of fixtures, see text accompanying notes
166-82 infra.
70. See, e.g., Douglas-Guardian Warehouse Corp. v. Esslair Endsley Co., 10 U.C.C.
REP. SERv. 176 (W.D. Mich. 1971). An unusual problem involving an allegedly misfiled
financing statement has been decided under Washington law by the Ninth Circuit. In
Siljeg v. National Bank of Commerce, 509 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1975), one Washington
corporation merged into a second under an agreement that the surviving corporation
would amend its articles of incorporation to assume a name identical to the company's
premerger name. Although no amendment to the articles was actually filed, as required
by Washington law, the Secretary of State issued on June 26, 1967, a.certificate confirming the merger and a second certificate stating in part: "I ... certify that the provisions
of the Merger Amendment changes [sic] the name of the surviving corporation to Henry
" 509 F.2d at 1010. The Secretary of State also
House Packing Company, Inc ..
altered the official records to reflect a name change of the surviving company. In apparent reliance on the above transactions, the defendant bank entered into a security agreement on June 30, 1967, covering inventory and accounts with the surviving firm. The
defendant had already prefiled a financing statement under the name of Henry House
Packing Company, Inc., as debtor, on June 15.
A proper amendment to the articles of the survivor was filed with the Secretary of
State on November 9, 1967, but was back dated to June 26, 1967. Pacific Nat'l Bank v.
Kramer, 77 Wash. 2d 899, 468 P.2d 436 (1970). The supreme court issued a writ of mandamus to correct the records to show that the legal name of the surviving corporation in
the merger was not Henry House Packing Co., Inc., until November 9, 1967. Bankruptcy
proceedings were opened on November 27, 1967.
The question before the Ninth Circuit was whether the defendant bank was properly
perfected in the collateral. The district court had held as a matter of law that the "true
name" of the debtor was as certified by the Secretary of State on June 26 and granted
summary judgment for the bank upon the trustee's claim that the interest was not perfected until November 9. The circuit court reversed and remanded for trial on the issue of
whether filing in the name of Henry House Packing Co., Inc., was seriously misleading to
other creditors. The court rejected a "true name" analysis because then "priority of one
creditor over another would turn on a mistake of the Secretary of State. The Uniform
Commercial Code is directed toward commercial realities, not corporate technicalities."

19791

U.C.C. 1972 Amendments

Text specifically resolves this problem: filing under the debtor's
legal name is both necessary and sufficient; inclusion of trade
names does not affect the sufficiency of the financing statement.
The financing statement may describe the collateral by
generic name (i.e., "accounts, inventory and chattel paper," or
"equipment") because the financing statement is intended
merely as notice that a security interest is claimed in collateral
of the nature listed. Third parties are expected to ask the named
secured party for details of the security interest and the exact
collateral it covers. Nevertheless, the financing statement will
only effectively perfect the interest in such collateral as is both
described in the agreement and listed by type on the financing
statement. For example, a financing statement listing only
inventory does not perfect a security interest in equipment.
The simplest possible filing system would be a central statewide index for all financing statements except those covering
property in which a real property mortgagee may also obtain an
interest." To alert real estate holders, holders of security interests in fixtures, timber, and minerals must file in the county
where the real property involved is located. This is the system
509 F.2d at 1012. The court directed the lower court to determine if Henry House was the
name by which the surviving corporation was known and thus if there "[wias information
available in the relevant business community which put creditors on notice that they
should have searched under the name Henry House Packing Co., Inc." Id. at 1013.
The Ninth Circuit's analysis in Siljeg is a reasonable and equitable solution to a
difficult problem not covered by the 1962 Text of Article 9. Despite the addition of the
first sentence of § 9-402(7) to the 1972 Text, Washington's adoption of this provision
would not affect the Ninth Circuit's resolution of this problem. Siljeg involved a dispute
about the precise legal name of the debtor and about the effect of the erroneous certificate issued by the State; the case did not involve an erroneous filing based on a mistaken
use of a debtor's trade name instead of his legal name. Comment 7 to the 1972 Text
makes clear that the drafters were thinking only in terms of resolving the trade name
cases by inclusion of the first sentence of § 9-402(7).
71. No personal property interest in minerals can exist until the minerals have been
severed from the ground, as is made clear in WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-107(1) (1979).
Once at the mine mouth or well head, however, minerals can become collateral for a
personal property security interest. Section 9-401(1) of the 1972 Text adds provisions for
local filing of interests in extracted minerals and standing timber. No references to either
are contained in the 1962 Text. For timber, at least, such was the case because a personal
property security interest in standing timber is not recognized under the 1962 Code.
Interestingly, there are no rules contained in Article 9 for determining priority between
properly filed U.C.C. timber or mineral interests and real estate claimants, as there are
in § 9-313 for resolving conflicts between fixture claimants and competing real estate
interests. A related section is § 2-107(3), which states that a sales contract for standing
timber or minerals to be extracted, when recorded in the real property records, "shall
then constitute notice to third parties of the buyer's rights under the contract for sale."
The U.C.C. financier's rights, once a financing statement is filed, would presumably be
fixed against real estate interests as well.
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proposed by the drafters and included in the Code as subsection
9-401(1), alternative one.7" Recognizing, however, strong political
pressure in some states to preserve the greater degree of local
filing which predominated under pre-Code law, the Code drafters
also included as alternatives for subsection 9-401(1) two other
filing schemes with progressively greater requirements for local
filing. In fact, well over one-half of all U..C.C. jurisdictions have
opted for alternatives two and three."
Once a proper financing statement is filed, the filing
remains valid for five years,74 or until a termination statement is
filed, whichever occurs first.75 If the secured party wishes to continue the validity of the filing beyond the initial five-year period,
he must file a continuation statement before the end of the
period.7" Failure to do so terminates the perfection of the security
interest and subordinates the now unperfected secured party to
the claims of all perfected junior liens, whether perfected before
7
or after the lapse of the secured party's perfection. " Refiling
after lapse will reperfect the interest, but only from the date of
refiling with no relation back.7"
Automatic perfection-that is perfection without either
filing or possession by the creditor or his agent-is permitted very
sparingly in Article 9. In only one significant case is automatic perfection granted for other than a short period of time
72. In the province of Ontario, where the basic structure of the Article 9 financing
system was adopted in 1970 as the Personal Property Security Act,.ONT. REV. STAT. ch.
344 (1970), the filing system has been further simplified, as each county has a filing
officer to whom all financing statements are directed. This officer has a computer terminal coupled to a central register. The local officer enters each filing directly into the central register and can retrieve all information filed province-wide under the name of a
given debtor. Because the filing officer is normally also the local officer in charge of the
real property records, filings destined for the real estate records can generally be directed
to the same person.
73. As noted earlier, Washington has adopted the second alternative of § 9-401(1).
See note 18 supra. Adoption of any alternative of the 1972 Text of § 9-401(1) would add
clarifying language on fixture filing and the references to local real estate filing of standing timber and mineral interests.
74. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-403(2) (1979).
75. Id. § 62A.9-404.
76. Id. § 62A.9-403(2).
77. See General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Isaacs, 90 Wash. 2d 234, 581 P.2d 1032 (1978)
(a security interest after lapse is subordinated to a federal tax lien perfected before the
security interest lapsed; refiling after a gap does not reestablish the original priorities);
Morse Electro Prods. Corp. v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Co., 90 Wash. 2d 195, 579 P.2d 1341
(1978) (a security interest after lapse is subordinated to a second security interest perfected before the first lapsed).
78. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Isaacs, 90 Wash. 2d 234, 581 P.2d 1032 (1978).
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before possession or filing is required. That case is the purchase
money security interest in consumer goods under subsection

9-302(1)(d). 5 Automatic perfection is permitted here for two
reasons: one, because pre-Code law permitted unrecorded purchase money security interests in consumer goods, and hence the
business community is accustomed to the risk of possible unrecorded interests when dealing with a consumer, and two,
because the relative cost of filing financing statements in these
primarily low dollar-value transactions would be prohibitive."s
The purchase money financier may elect to file a financing statement if he wishes, and in fact there is an incentive to do so. An
unfiled purchase money security interest in consumer go,- is
subject to defeat if before it is filed the consumer goods are resold to another consumer who is without actual knowledge of the
security interest."' This last provision demonstrates that the
exception of automatic perfection in purchase money security
interests is designed to meet the prior practices and the expectations of the business community.
The other significant cases of automatic perfection are to
facilitate transactions in which relatively rapid filing or transfer
79. Washington U.C.C. § 9-302 contains at least two other less significant cases of
automatic perfection: (1) a purchase money security interest in farm equipment with a
purchase price not exceeding $2500, WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-302(1)(c) (1979); and (2)
an assignment of accounts or contract rights which does not "alone or in conjunction with
other assignments to the same assignee" constitute a transfer of a "significant part of the
outstanding accounts" of the transferor, id. § 62A.9-301(1)(e). Adoption of § 9-301 of the
1972 Text would eliminate the farm equipment instance, and adoption of the 1972 Text
as a whole would remove the reference to contract rights in the assignment instance because the 1972 text eliminates contract rights as a separate class of collateral. Subsection
9-302(1)(e) nevertheless has generated substantial litigation concerning assignees of
accounts who discover belatedly that their assignment constitutes a transaction subject
to Article 9 and attempt to invoke this exception when their interests are attacked as
unperfected. The scope of this exception to filing has already been litigated in Washing.
ton. In Architectural Woods, Inc. v. State, 88 Wash. 2d 406, 562 P.2d 248 (1977), the
supreme court correctly required the party invoking the exception to establish that the
assignment was "casual and isolated" under all of the circumstances of the transaction.
Id. at 410, 562 P.2d at 250. The court specifically rejected the reasoning of cases from
other jurisdictions which compare the dollar amount of the assignment in dispute with
the total dollar value of all the debtor's accounts to determine if the assignment is a
"significant part" of the debtor's accounts. See Standard Lumber Co. v. Chamber
Frames, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
Because the uncertainty of application of Washington U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(e) is the
stuff of which lawsuits are made, no attorney should advise reliance on this exception
under any circumstances.
80. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 23-7, at 799 (1972).
81. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-307(2) (1979).

University of Puget Sound Law Review

26

[Vol. 3:1

of possession is expected after the transaction is consummated.
Most important among these circumstances are the ten-day initial automatic perfection granted to all purchase money security
interests in subsection 9-301(2), the initial automatic ten-day
perfection in proceeds on disposition of collateral under subsection 9-306(3), and the initial automatic twenty-one day perfection in instruments and negotiable documents under the conditions contained in subsection 9-304(4).81 Finally, under subsection 9-304(5), instruments, negotiable documents, and goods
in possession of a bailee other than goods for which a negotiable document is outstanding (primarily goods in a field ware-_
house) may be released to the debtor for up to twenty-one days
for certain specific purposes without loss of perfection. If the documents or goods remain in the debtor's hands for more than
twenty-one days, a filing must be made or perfection is lost;
because filing is not effective for instruments, possession of
instruments must be recovered within twenty-one days or the
83
security interest becomes unperfected.
For most items of collateral, perfection can be obtained
either by the creditor taking possession or by filing a financing
statement. The nature of some. items of collateral, however,
requires that perfection occur by only one or the other method.
Accounts and general intangibles are not represented by any particular piece of paper the possession of which confers special
rights upon the owner. Consequently, there is no tangible evidence of an account or general intangible of which a creditor can
take possession to give third-party notice of his claim. Therefore,
perfection as to accounts and general intangibles is possible only
by filing.14 On the other hand, instruments confer rights on the
party in possession which are superior to the claims of other persons, as provided by rules codified in Article 3 for negotiable
instruments and Article 8 for investment securities. Allowing the
perfection of property rights in such collateral by filing would
contradict the free circulation policy of the holder in due course
and the bona fide purchaser doctrines.5 Therefore, a security
82. None of these provisions is altered from the 1962 Text.

83.

WASH. REv. CODE

§ 62A.9-304(6).

84. Id. § 62A.9-302(1).
85. See, e.g., id. §§ 62A.3-302, .3-305 (negotiable instruments); id. § 62A.8-301
(investment securities).
Section 9-309 confirms the priority of these principles by providing that the rights of
a holder in due course of a negotiable. instrument and of a bona fide purchaser of an
investment security are not affected by the rules of Article 9.
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interest in money or instruments may be perfected only through
possession,"' except in those limited circumstances of short term
automatic perfection just mentioned, at the end of which continued perfection rests in each case on the creditor obtaining possession of the collateral.8 7 Security interests in the other items of
collateral, namely goods, chattel paper, and negotiable documents, can be perfected either by filing8 or by possession. 9
While a security interest can be perfected in a negotiable
document by filing or by possession, one must consider what a
document of title represents. Documents, governed by Article 7,
constitute receipts issued by a bailee for goods deposited with
him. Such documents may be issued by a freight forwarder or by
a person in the storage business. In the former case, they are
called bills of lading; in the latter, warehouse receipts. Any doc-,
ument can be issued in negotiable or nonnegotiable form.9 0 A
nonnegotiable document can be characterized merely as an
acknowledgment by the issuer-bailee of his acceptance of the
goods and a promise to hold and return the goods to the person
in whose name the receipt is issued. Article 9 characterizes a
security interest in goods in the possession of a bailee who has
not issued a negotiable document as a security interest in the
goods themselves.9 Such a security interest can be perfected by
filing as to the goods under subsection 9-304(3) or by obtaining
the bailee's acknowledgment that he is in possession of the goods
as the secured party's agent, i.e., perfection through possession.
The acknowledgment may be through the bailee's issuing of a
nonnegotiable recript in the secured party's name. 92
Nonnegotiable warehouse receipts are frequently used in financing
arrangements called field warehousing 3 under which an inventory
86. U.C.C. § 9-304(1) (1972 version).
87. Id. § 9-304, Official Comment 1.
88. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-304(1) (1979).
89. Id. § 62A.9-305.
90. Id. § 62A.7-104.
91. See id. § 62A.9-304(3).
92. Id.
93. Because no sure method of obtaining a nonpossessory interest in inventory
existed in some states, field warehousing was used extensively prior to adoption of the
U.C.C. See generally 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 38, at §§.6.1-.5. Field warehousing created
a possessory security interest in the debtor's inventory through the medium of the field
warehousing firm acting as agent for the secured party. Because field warehousing is
nothing more than a pledge, it is not treated separately in Article 9, except in § 9-304(3).
Even after the advent of the U.C.C. floating lien, field warehousing continues to be used
in those situations where direct inventory control by the secured party is considered necessary or desirable. For field warehousing to be a valid security device, however, the
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financier actually takes possession of the inventory of the
merchant he is financing through the medium of a professional
bailee. The bailee sets up storage facilities on the debtor's
property, takes possession of the collateral, and issues to the
financier nonnegotiable warehouse receipts representing the goods
in the bailee-agent's possession. Thus, in substance, there cannot
be a security interest in nonnegotiable documents independent of
the goods they represent.
In contrast to nonegotiable documents, negotiable documents
9
in the hands of a holder to whom they have been duly negotiated '
give rights in the goods themselves free and clear of the claims of
any third party to the goods, 5 subject only to three situations that
are outside the scope of this paper." This means, first, that a
security interest in goods properly perfected by filing, which is
created before they have been delivered to a bailee who has issued
a negotiable document, is defeated by a third party to whom the
document is duly negotiated; second, that a person who perfects a
security interest in a negotiable document by filing (as might be
the case if the document were proceeds upon the disposition of
other collateral) will also be defeated by due negotiation of the
document to a second secured party. These principles are
reiterated in section 9-309, which states that a holder of a duly
negotiated document of title takes priority over an earlier security
interest even though it may be perfected.
A security interest in chattel paper can be perfected either by
possession under section 9-305 or by filing under subsection
9-304(1). Chattel paper frequently arises as proceeds from the sale
of inventory already subject to a security interest. In such event,
the chattel paper itself is subject to the inventory financier's
security interest, which continues automatically into proceeds
under subsection 9-306(3)." What is the legal situation if the
debtor fails to deliver the chattel paper to this financier but
instead sells or assigns the rights embodied in the chattel paper to
a third party, who gives a new value and takes possession of the
paper? A conflict then exists between a claimant of a security
collateral must in fact be removed from the debtor's control, if only by segregation under
lock and key on the debtor's premises. See Business Factors, Inc. v. Taylor-Edwards
Warehouse & Transfer Co., 21 Wash. App. 441, 585 P.2d 825 (1978).
94. See WASH. REv. CODE §§ 62A.1-201(20), .7-501(4) (1979).
95. Id. § 62A.7-502.
96. See id. §§ 62A.7-205, .7-402, .7-503.
97. As discussed in the text at notes 166-82 infra, methods of perfection in proceeds
have been substantially altered from the 1962 to the 1972 Text.
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interest in the chattel paper by filing and a claimant of a security
interest by possession. Section 9-308 determines that the
possessory security interest prevails in most cases. Article 9
therefore grants the possessor of chattel paper rights similar to,
but not quite as sweeping as, the rights of persons in possession of
commercial paper granted in Articles 3, 7, and 8.
The discussion of perfection thus far has omitted one
economically significant kind of personal property-automobiles
and other vehicles subject to certificate of title statutes. Every
state of the United States now has a statute requiring the issuance
of a title certificate at the time of any new registration of an
automobile." Under each of these laws, any security interest
claimed in the vehicle must be entered on the certificate of title
form by the proper state authorities. The Code does not govern the
issuance of title certificates nor determine to what vehicles title
certificate statutes extend. Subsections 9-302(3)(b) and (4),
however, recognize that entry of a lien on a title certificate
constitutes perfection for U.C.C. purposes." Also, title certificates
do not issue on vehicles that have not left the dealer's stock.
Hence, the Code's perfection requirements govern security interests in vehicles while they remain inventory held for sale.' 0 The
1962 Text of section 9-302 does not expressly state that security
interests in dealer inventory are subject to the normal filing
requirements; the 1972 Text makes the point clear.
VI.

SPECIAL PRIORITY PROBLEMS FOR PERFECTED SECURITY

INTERESTS

In the following paragraphs a number of special problems
concerning perfected security interests will be covered. These
include inventory and accounts receivable financing, validity of
Code financing in the event of the debtor's bankruptcy, conflict
among liens on the same collateral, continuation of perfection in
collateral and its proceeds upon disposition of the collateral by the
debtor, overlap of personal property and real property law, and
interstate movement of collateral or of the debtor.
98. For a list of certificate of title laws, see Meyers, Multi-State Motor Vehicle
Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 OKLA. L. REv. 834, 890 (1977).
99. Subsections (3) and (4) of § 9-302 were reformulated in the 1972 Text to make
the meaning clearer, but no change in substance was made from the 1962 Text.
100. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-302(3) (1979).
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Validity of After-Acquired Property Clauses in Bankruptcy

When the Code was first promulgated, one of the most controversial features of Article 9 was the specific authorization,
now contained in subsection 9-204(1) of the 1972 Text, of afteracquired property clauses in inventory and accounts receivable
financing. The effect of an after-acquired property clause is simple. The creditor's security interest continues to attach to collateral obtained subsequent to the original attachment of the security interest. Thus, under the Code if a security interest has been
perfected by the filing of a financing statement and the debtor
obtains new collateral to which the security interest attaches, it
is immediately perfected in the new collateral without the necessity of a further filing. In practice, this means that a financier
can maintain his security interest as the debtor sells and
acquires replacement inventory or as the debtor collects accounts
and creates new accounts by further sales.
The controversy surrounding after-acquired property clauses
revolved around the trustee's power to avoid preferential transfers under section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.101 The
proper resolution of this alleged difficulty occupied much of the
effort of the country's chief commercial law scholars for more
than for a decade. 0 2 Under the provisions of section 60, the bankruptcy trustee could defeat a security interest perfected in the
bankrupt's property within four months preceeding bankruptcy
under two conditions: (1) the indebtedness existed before the
interest was perfected and (2) the secured creditor had cause to
believe the debtor was insolvent at the time his interest became
perfected. Since inventory or accounts receivable financing
requires careful policing of the debtor and his financial condition, a secured creditor almost always has extensive information
concerning his debtor's financial position. Therefore, it was
101. 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1976) (repealed 1978).
102. The Ninth Circuit in DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969), cited a
total of 19 law review articles published between 1959 and 1969 on the validity of U.C.C.
inventory and accounts receivable financing. Id. at 1280 n.2. The DuBay court sustained
the U.C.C. financing scheme in the face of attack by the debtor's bankruptcy trustee. In
the years following, however, still more articles flowed from the pens of the country's
most eminent bankruptcy "bulls" and financing experts. See, e.g., Countryman, Code
Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 75 COM. L.J. 269 (1970); Kripke, Inventory and Receivable Financing Under the Uniform Commercial Code and The Bankruptcy Act, 87 BANKING

L.J. 579 (1970).
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widely predicted that inventory and accounts receivable financing under U.C.C. after-acquired property clauses would fail
because under the superior federal bankruptcy statute, the
security interest would be declared invalid on all inventory
acquired or accounts receivable created within four months of
the debtor's ensuing bankruptcy if no new advance of money was
made at the time the debtor received the inventory or created
the accounts. The drafters of Article 9 recognized this threat and
attempted to avoid the effect of the Bankruptcy Act by including
section 9-108, which states that the attachment of a security
interest under an after-acquired property clause to collateral
newly acquired in the ordinary course of the debtor's business
will be deemed to have been for new value and not for an antecedent indebtedness. Clearly, section 9-108 is an attempt to control
the meaning of words in a federal statute, and, as such, is ineffective. 0 3 Notwithstanding the apparent problem in statutory
language, the Code's inventory and accounts receivable financing
schemes were upheld in every reported decision, and it was well
established prior to the repeal of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 that
this financing technique will withstand the debtor's bankruptcy . o4
The problem solved itself because each court considering the
validity of inventory or accounts financing recognized the
economic necessity and the popularity of these financing
techniques.
Congress has also recognized the need for, and upheld the
validity of, U.C.C. inventory and accounts receivable financing
in the new Bankruptcy Reform Act. Under subsection 547(c)(5)
of the new Act such financing is sustained from the trustee's
attack as a preferential transfer to the extent of the least dollar
amount of collateral held during the ninety days"0 5 prior to bankruptcy. Therefore, under the new Act the secured party who
carefully polices his collateral to insure that he remains fully
secured at all times has nothing to fear from his debtor's
bankruptcy.
103. See, e.g., In re Platt, 257 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
104. See, e.g., DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969); Grain Merchants,
Inc. v. Union Bank & Savings Co., 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1969); Rosenberg v. Rudnick,
262 F. Supp. 635 (D. Mass. 1967). For a discussion on the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act's
treatment of inventory and accounts receivable financing, see text accompanying note
105 infra.
105. The new Bankruptcy Act uses 90 days as the crucial prebankruptcy period in
contrast to the 1898 Act's four month period. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(5)(A) (West 1979).
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Mechanic's Liens

When an individual takes goods to a workman for repairs
and later refuses to pay the bill, absent any agreement between
owner and repairman, the repairman by common law or statute' 0" has a lien on the goods in his possession for the value of his
parts and labor. He may retain possession of the goods as against
the owner until his bill is satisfied, and he may07 eventually sell
the goods to realize his claim if he is not paid.
A more complex problem arises when the goods are collateral for a security interest perfected before they have been delivered to the workman. Can the workman retain the goods as
against a secured party with a prior perfected security interest, if
the secured creditor demands them after the debtor's default?
Pre-Code rules of the various states were in disagreement over
the relative priority of the two liens mentioned above. Some
states, including Washington, followed the general rule of first in
time is first in right, either by provision in their chattel lien statutes'0 or by case law,' ° and permitted the secured party to
reclaim the goods from the statutory lienor; other states afforded
workmen a super-priority over previously perfected interests,
rationalizing that a workman cannot fairly be required to check
the chattel mortgage filing index prior to commencing work on
articles left for repair."0
In section 9-310 the Code attempts to regulate this problem
by adopting as a general rule the super-priority of the mechanic lienor in possession over the previously perfected U.C.C.
security interest, unless the statute under which the mechanic
claims his lien specifically provides otherwise. The Washington
Text of section 9-310 departs radically from the Official 1962 and
1972 Texts"' by reversing the rule, so that the mechanic lienor in
possession will take priority over the earlier perfected security
106. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 60.08.010 (1979).
107. See id. ch. 60.10.
108. E.g., id. § 60.08.030. This provision, which has remained unchanged since 1917,
expressly subordinates the general possessory mechanic's lien on chattels to any lien perfected by filing prior to the moment work began.
the
109. In Levitch v. Link, 95 Wash. 639, 164 P. 233 (1917) (decided the same year
subover
super-priority
liens
mechanic's
give
to
general chattel lien statute was amended
sequently recorded liens and previously unrecorded liens), the Washington Supreme Court
subheld the livery stable keeper's (agister's) lien, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 60.56 (1979), was
ordinate to an earlier perfected mortgage in the absence of statutory language expressly
granting priority to the statutory lien.
110. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 38, at § 33.2.
111. The language of the 1962 Text of § 9-310 remains unchanged in the 1972 Text.
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interest only if the lien is statutory and the statute expressly
provides for such priority. With this modification, Washington
has thus preserved its pre-Code rules subordinating possessor
chattel liens to earlier perfected security interests." ' Applying
Washington section 9-310 in conjunction with the possessory lien
statutes may result unexpectedly in a person receiving nothing
despite his efforts to enhance or preserve the value of a secured
party's collateral. The fault, however, lies with Washington's preCode lien rules. A first step in rectifying this apparent injustice
could be taken by the adoption of the Official Text of section 9-310
when the 1972 U.C.C. amendments are considered by the
legislature.
Notably, neither the 1972 Text of section 9-310 nor the
Washington variation provides guidance for determining priority
between a statutory lien granted to a laborer or materialman not
in possession and a security interest in the common debtor's
property filed prior to the beginning of the statutory lienor's
work. 1 3 Nor does section 9-310 provide any rule for determining
priority between a perfected security interest and a statutory lien
thereafter arising in favor of a governmental agency for taxes due
112. Only two possessory mechanic's liens are recognized in Washington: the general
chattel lien, WAsH. REV. CODE ch. 60.08 (1979), and the livery stable keeper's (agister's)
lien, id. ch. 60.56. Because the former statute contains an express subordination to prior
perfected interests, only the agister's lien is affected by the alteration from the Official
Text of § 9-310. The Washington Supreme Court has declared the agister's lien
subordinate to an earlier perfected interest in the absence of express statutory language
granting priority. Levitch v. Link, 95 Wash. 639, 164 P. 233 (1917). See notes 109-10
supra.
113. A conflict may arise, for example, between an unpaid workman claiming a lien
under the general laborers' and materialmen's lien statute, WAsH. REv. CODE ch. 60.04
(1979), against a landowner's property for work performed installing fixtures and a security interest in the same fixtures properly perfected through a fixture filing by the supplier. If the words "encumbrances . . . of real estate" in § 9-313 are read to include
statutory lienors, then this priority conflict is resolved under § 9-313. Section 9-313 probably should be read, however, as being limited to governing the relative rights of U.C.C.
claimants against real property mortgagees and judicial lien creditors, as neither the section nor the official comments mention statutory lienors. Consequently, the answer to the
priority conflict between fixture interests and statutory lienors must be found either in
the lien statute itself or in common law. In Washington the answer is easy. In 1975 the
legislature rewrote the laborers' and materialmen's lien statute, id. § 60.04.050, to provide, as in the chattel lien statute, id. § 60.08.030, for express subordination of the laborers' and materialmen's lien to prior perfected interests in the land owner's property.
Other conflicts may arise between a U.C.C. financier and claimants under such
diverse statutes as the lumbermen's lien, id. ch. 60.24, and the restaurant employees'
lien, id. ch. 60.34. Some Washington nonpossessory statutory liens provide for superpriority of the statutory lien claimant over preexisting perfected liens. See, e.g., id.
§ 60.24.038 (lumbermen's lien). Other nonpossessory statutory liens do not. See, e.g., id.
§ 60.20.020 (nurserymen's lien). No generalization can be made.
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of for other sums owing from the debtor."'
C.

Buyers of the Collateral

1. In General
Pursuant to sections 9-201 and 9-306(2), a security interest
continues in collateral despite its sale, unless one of a number of
important exceptions applies. The superior rights of buyers of
chattel paper, instruments, and negotiable documents recognized in sections 9-308 and 9-309, and the right of a consumer
buyer to take free of an unfiled purchase money security interest
in consumer goods under subsection 9-307(2), have already been
mentioned."15 Other than the secured party's authorization of a
disposition free of his security interest, the only other exception
is the important principle that a buyer of inventory sold in the
ordinary course of the seller's business" ' takes free of any security interest in the inventory created by his seller, even though its
existence is known to the buyer." 7 The principle is an old one in
Anglo-American law"' and made inventory financing not especially attractive until the advent of the U.C.C. But the possibili114. I.R.C. § 6323(a) gives priority over a federal tax lien to security interests perfected before the federal tax lien has been filed. By amendments adopted in 1966,
§ 6323(c) also permits priority over a filed tax lien for a previously filed security interest
with respect to advances made to the debtor and in property acquired by the debtor
within 45 days after the tax lien has been filed. With respect to any advances made to, or
property acquired by, the debtor more than 45 days after the tax lien has been filed, the
federal government assumes priority. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. United States, 466 F.2d
1040 (5th Cir. 1972). For rules on filing United States tax liens, see I.R.C. § 6323(f)(1)-(4)
and WASH. REV. CODE ch. 60.68 (1979). See also text accompanying note 66 supra.
115. See text accompanying notes 81 & 84-89 supra.
116. See WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.1-201(9) (1979).
117. Id. § 62A.9-307(1).
118. One pre-Code Washington case allowed a buyer to take free of the interest
claimed by the conditional seller to his seller. Schoenfeld's Standard Furniture Co. v.
Stoe, 175 Wash. 201, 27 P.2d 564 (1933). A more recent Washington case illustrates the
extent of U.C.C. protection afforded by § 9-307(1) to the buyer in the ordinary course of
business. As a means of perfecting its security interest in a used housetrailer held as stock
in trade of its debtor, an inventory financier took physical possession of the title certificate. When the debtor, a mobile home dealer, sold the trailer and defaulted on its obligation to turn the proceeds over to the secured party, the latter repossessed the trailer from
the buyers. The repossession violated the rights of the buyers, as buyers in the ordinary
course from the debtor, despite the secured party's retention of the certificate. Williams
v. Western Surety Co., 6 Wash. App. 300, 492 P.2d 596 (1972). In the course of its opinion
the court of appeals emphasized that § 9-307(1) is merely a special case of the more
general rule on transfer of title by a merchant who is "entrusted" with possession of
goods of the kind in which he deals. Id. at 301-03, 492 P.2d at 597-98. See WASH. REv.
CODE § 62A.2-403(2)-(3) (1979).
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ties for "rolling over" the security interest into subsequently
obtained inventory under an after-acquired property clause, coupled with the opportunity to continue perfection in the proceeds
of sale, make the impact of subsection 9-307(1) minimal for the
diligent inventory financier.
2.

Buyers of Farm Products

The rule protecting buyers in the ordinary course of business
from an interest created by the seller in his inventory is subject
to one important and very troublesome exception: a purchase of
farm products'" from a farmer will not terminate a security
interest created by the farmer unless, as provided in subsection
9-306(2), the financier authorized the sale.' ° Thus, whenever a
farmer sells mortgaged crops or livestock absent express authorization and for any reason fails to remit the proceeds to the
financier, the buyer is subject to a successful action for conversion, if he is unable to establish another legally sufficient basis
for discharging the security interest.
Two cases in this area have reached the Washington appellate courts. In the first, Central Washington Production Credit
Association v. Baker,' the court of appeals reversed a summary
judgment entered on behalf of a livestock financier and
remanded for trial on the issue of whether plaintiff financier had
either waived the requirement of prior written consent or authorized the sale "by its prior course of conduct" in similar transactions with other debtors. The court stressed that the record
showed not only a series of fourteen sales over three years by the
119. Farm products are defined in § 9-109(3). In the context of the following discussion, farm products would be inventory in the absence of § 9-109(3), as they are produced
by the farmer for sale in the ordinary course of business.
120. As a consequence, farm financiers' security agreements regularly contain
clauses prohibiting sale without prior written authorization. The language contained in
the agreement litigated in Central Wash. Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Baker, 11 Wash. App. 17,
521 P.2d 226 (1974) read: "[D]ebtor will not permit any of the collateral to be . . . sold,
• . . without first having obtained the written consent of the Secured Party." Id. at 18,
521 P.2d at 226 (emphasis omitted). To judge from the description of farm financing
practices in two widely separated areas of Washington, express authorization for a sale is
seldom sought by the farmer in advance, unless he is dealing with a buyer apprised of
the rule of § 9-307(1). Such buyers presumably will either demand the farmer produce
written authorization or seek it directly from the farm financier. See Southwest Wash.
Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 19 Wash. App. 397, 577 P.2d 589 (1978),
rev'd, 92 Wash. 2d 30, 593 P.2d 167 (1979); Central Wash. Prod. Credit Ass'n v.
Baker, 11 Wash. App. 17, 521 P.2d 226 (1974).
121. 11 Wash. App. 17, 521 P.2d 226 (1974).

36

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 3:1

particular debtor without prior written or oral consent, 2 2 but also
a general practice not to enforce the provisions of similar agreements against other farmers.
In the more recent case, Southwest Washington Production
Credit Association v. Seattle-First National Bank,'23 the court of
appeals reversed judgment for the plaintiff crop financier and
held that the financier's conduct in the course of performance of
the security agreements constituted a waiver of its security when
the collateral was sold by the farmers. The court found that the
plaintiff had had frequent contact throughout the year with the
farmers involved and was informed of, and acquiesced in, their
plans to sell on credit to the particular buyer. Further, the plaintiff had not objected to the sale until the purchaser had become
insolvent and failed to remit the agreed purchase price.' 24 From
these and other facts, the court in a well reasoned opinion, citing
subsection 2-208(3) of the Sales Article,2 5 concluded that plaintiffs course of conduct in administering the security agreements
in question constituted overwhelming evidence that a waiver of
the provision requiring written authorization prior to sale had
occurred. 2 ' In a brief opinion, the Washington Supreme Court,
however, unanimously reversed and reinstated the trial court's
finding that the financier's acquiescence in the sale had been
conditioned upon its receipt of full payment.127 Nonpayment by
the debtors reestablished the security interests in the collateral
in the hands of the buyer and defeated the competing claim of
122. The financier objected to only one sale, the one in which proceeds had not been
remitted. Id. at 19, 521 P.2d at 227.
123. 19 Wash. App. 397, 577 P.2d 589 (1978), rev'd, 92 Wash. 2d 30, 593 P.2d 167
(1979).
124. The financier sought to enforce its security interest in crops sold by the farmers
on open credit to a food processor that became insolvent before completing payments to
the farmers. The principal defendant was the processor's own inventory financier, which
claimed a lien on the crops in the processor's hands as after-acquired collateral. Id. at
399, 577 P.2d at 590.
125. The court directly applied § 2-208(3) of the Sales Article to find a waiver in a
transaction to which Article 2 is not technically applicable. While such an argument
technically is incorrect, the court could have couched its use of § 2-208 in terms of application "by analogy." For a case discussing whether provisions of Article 2 apply to transactions within Article 9, see Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 290 A.2d 648 (Del.
1972).
126. The court noted that the financier would have been adequately protected had it
required the farmers to retain a purchase money security interest on the sale (and presumably assign it to the financier), or had it placed an express condition reserving its
security on the sale. 19 Wash. App. at 402, 577 P.2d at 592.
127. Southwest Wash. Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 92 Wash. 2d
30, 593 P.2d 167 (1979).
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the buyer's inventory financier. The court held that the trial
court's finding was supported by adequate evidence.' Although
conceding that the question of waiver is one of fact, the supreme
court's reversal of the court of appeals essentially indicates that
a buyer who cannot establish written authorization for a sale has
little expectation of prevailing in the absence of a showing of
affirmative representations, either to himself or to the farmers,
that the security interest will be waived.
The Production Credit case emphasizes that to insure clear
title to all his purchases, the buyer of farm products must be
advised of the practical necessity of undertaking a filing search
under the name of every one of his farmer-sellers and dealing
directly with any financier whom the search uncovers. The buyer
can then judge for himself whether the risk of losing a purchase
to a financier justifies the cost involved. More significantly, the
case raises the question of whether continued special treatment
of security interests in farm products, and of farmers as a group,
is justified under modern economic conditions.
In the 1962 Washington Text of Article 9, references to farmers and farm products are limited to five substantive provisions:'" subsections 9-204(4) and (6), regulating time of attachment of security interests to crops and livestock; subsection
9-302(1)(c), granting automatic perfection of purchase money
interests in farm equipment of relatively low value; subsection
9-307(1); and subsection 9-401(1), requiring local filing of interests
in farm collateral. All of these special provisions relating to farms
and farm products should be eliminated from a revised
Washington Text of Article 9.
Two of these provisions, the rules for attachment to crops
and automatic perfection for interests in farm equipment, would
be deleted by adoption of the 1972 Official Text. A third, nonuniform subsection 9-204(6), added to protect the cash seller of
livestock from losing his property to a meat packer's inventory
financier in the event a check taken in payment is dishonored,
should be extended to all sellers for the compelling reasons previously discussed.30
Now that the Code has been in effect for over twelve years,
the convenience and simplicity of the new central filing system
128. Id. at 34, 593 P.2d at 169.
129. In addition, the definition of farm products is contained in WASH. REV.
62A.9-109(3) (1979).
130. See text accompanying notes 50-56 infra.

CODE §
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for all security interests (other than those intended to be indexed
in the local real property records) has become obvious. No need
exists for continued local filing of interests in farm collateral. A
single central filing eliminates risk to both the financier and
searcher in determining either the county of the farmer's residence or the county where crops are located. Both the 1962 and
1972 Codes offer as a preferred alternative for the rules on filing
location 13' central filing for all interests except those intended to
be perfected against competing real estate interests. Tradition
should not be sufficient ground for retaining local filing. Unless a
compelling reason for continued local filing can be established,
the legislature should conform the filing rules to alternative one
32
of subsection 9-401(1) to eliminate this unnecessary distinction.
The last and most significant farm provision is subsection
9-307(1) itself. The official comments offer no justification for the
special treatment extended to buyers of farm products from
farmers. Are they somehow different from other inventory sellers? No matter what the case might have been when the farming
exception to subsection 9-307(1) was first included in early drafts
of the Code, farm operations today are business concerns,
whether large or small, and the provision deserves reexamination. 33 Subsection 9-307(1) does not protect the farmer because
the beneficiaries are the farm lenders, who are sheltered from the
normal risks and the normal policing obligations of their inven131. See U.C.C. § 9-401(1) (First Alternative) (1972 version).
132. Alternative two of § 9-401(1), adopted in Washington, also calls for local filing
of security interests in consumer goods. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-401(1) (1979). Alternative one would require central filing for consumer goods financing as well as farm financing. The same points-ease of access and certainty of proper location-justify central
filing for consumer goods.
133. Previous commentators have argued for change in the rule of § 9-307(1) concerning farm products. See, e.g., Dolan, Section 9-307(l): The U. C. C. 's Obstacle to Agricultural Commerce in the Open Market, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 706 (1977); Comment, "Farm
Products" Under the U. C.C.-Is a Special ClassificationDesirable?, 47 Tx. L. REV. 309
(1969). But, as explained by Professor Hawkland, the federal government, as a major
supplier and guarantor of farm credit, has opposed efforts to remove the farm products
rule from the Official Text of the Code, and federal officials have threatened to seek
federal legislation giving federally financed farm loans the same priority over farm product purchasers as presently accorded all farm lenders in the Code. A federal rule would
clearly prevail over contrary state law where federal loans are concerned but would not
affect loans from nonfederal sources. The threats directed by the federal government at
the drafters of the Official Text should not dissuade legislatures from enacting on an
individual basis the nonuniform amendment eliminating the special advantages accorded
.the farm financier. See Hawkland, The. Proposed Amendment to Article 9 of the
UC.C.-Part 1: Financing the Farmer, 76 COM. L.J. 416, 420 (19714.
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tory security agreements. It can hardly be maintained that farm
lenders, whether commercial entities or federally-financed cooperative associations, are less sophisticated or less able to police
the collateral than are other inventory lenders, or that farmers as
a class are so much more dishonest borrowers that additional
protection is required. Obviously, if there is risk that a farmer
may sell the collateral to the detriment of the lender, lending
costs-both policing and losses-will rise. But these are costs of
doing business and may be shifted forward to the farmer as
slightly higher rates and from the farmer forward to the buyer as
slightly higher farm prices. Moreover, the commensurate buyer
protection arising from repeal of the farm products provision of
subsection 9-307(1) should lower costs in an amount equal to the
costs of the change in law. The Washington Legislature should
amend subsection 9-307(1) to delete all reference to farmers and
farm products in order to render inventory financing practices
uniform throughout all industries. 13'
D.

Competing U C.C. Financiers-The General Rule

Subject to the rules favoring possessory interests in chattel
paper and negotiable documents and to rules granting priority to
purchase money security interests under certain conditions, the
general rule of priority among conflicting security interests in the
same collateral under the 1972 Text is that the first to file a
financing statement or to perfect in the collateral will prevail. 3 5 This priority rule is based upon a major departure from
pre-Code Washington law: 136 introduction of so-called "prefiling," permitting the secured creditor to file a financing statement before the transaction between the parties is completed
(i.e., before the security interest has attached).137 Thus, it is pos134. The suggested amendment of § 9-307(1) would render unnecessary the 1972
amendment to § 9-301(1)(c), which adds the words "or is a buyer of farm products in the
ordinary course of business."
135. U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1972 version). See generally Jackson & Kronman, Secured
Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979). Of course, two
secured creditors can alter the statutory priorities by entering into an agreement between
themselves. Section 9-316 explicitly recognizes the validity of a subordination agreement
made by anyone entitled to priority in the collateral.
136. In his 1967 analysis of pre-Code Washington law, Professor Shattuck doubted
whether a pre-filing under the conditional sales or chattel mortgage statutes would be
valid in the face of language requiring filing within ten days after the debtor was put in
possession or the advance was made. Shattuck, supra note 58, at 691-92.
137. See WASH. Rv. CODE § 62A.9-402(1) (1979). For a discussion of attachment, see
text accompanying notes 35-47 supra.
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sible and, in fact, normal practice for the secured party to file a
financing statement prior to making his initial advance of credit
to the debtor and even prior to signing the definitive security
agreement. Because the U.C.C., in further contrast to pre-Code
8
Washington law,'3 grants no grace period of initial automatic
secuprotection after attachment for purpose of perfecting any
ten
the
than
rity interest requiring filing or possession (other
claimed
days for purchase money security interests and interests
in collateral received as proceeds, and the twenty-one days for
certain interests in documents and instruments), creditors must
prefile to avoid any gap between attachment and perfection
39
obtain priority.'
which might allow another interest to
The first to file or perfect rule under the 1972 Text can be
further illustrated by two examples, the second of which will also
illustrate a logical defect in the Washington Text. (1) A files on
January 2, but first completes his agreement with the debtor and
makes an advance on January 10. In the interim, on January 5,
B files and makes his advance on the same collateral, thus
perfecting prior to A. But A wins as first to file or perfect. This
the Chattel
138. Washington pre-Code law allowed grace periods for filing under
Act, ch.
Sales
Conditional
1965);
(repealed
406
Mortgage Act, ch. 156, 1929 Wash. Laws
Receivable
Accounts
1967);
effective
(repeal
1965)
(repealed
253
Laws
Wash.
1893
106,
ch. 71, 1943 Wash.
Act, ch. 8, 1947 Wash. Laws 20 (repealed 1965); Trust Receipts Act,
TERR. CODE OF WASH. ch.
1881
statute,
sale
of
bill
the
and
1965);
(repealed
134
Laws
rules in Washington
172, § 2327 (repealed 1965). But the application of the grace period
of sale statute,
was particularly harsh. Except for the Trust Receipts Act and the bill
no effect. See
of
was
expired
had
period
grace
ten-day
the
after
filing under these statutes
Worley v. MetroClark v. Kilian, 116 Wash. 532, 199 P. 721 (1921) (chattel mortgages);
sales). The language
politan Motor Car Co., 72 Wash. 243, 130 P. 107 (1913) (conditional
statute was identical
relating to grace periods under the accounts receivable assignment
only court to conbut never judicially tested. The Washington court in Worley was the
within the
perfected
not
interest
an
that
Act
clude under the Uniform Conditional Sales
void.
was
period
grace
began were dracoIn addition, the Washington rules as to when the ten-day period
date shown on the
the
from
ran
period
the
statute
sales
conditional
the
Under
nian.
though it could be
conditional sales contract as the date of delivery of the collateral, even
Bros. Furniture
established that the date on the contract was entered in error. Grunbaum
for reform
possibility
No
(1926).
567
P.
251
329,
Wash.
Co. v. Humphrey Inv. Corp., 141
224 (9th Cir. 1962).
of the contract existed. See Pacific Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 304 F.2d
when it was
Under the express language of the Trust Receipts Act, filing was effective
1943 Wash. Laws
accomplished, if first accomplished after the grace period ran. Ch. 71,
Umbarger v.
134 (repealed 1965). The court similarly construed the Bill of Sale Act in
(1938).
818
Berrian, 195 Wash. 348, 80 P.2d
or taking of
139. Unlike the Washington result under pre-Code filing statutes, filing
the
perfects
merely
interest
security
possession subsequent to the attachment of the
the interest
protecting
accomplished,
is
possession
or
filing
the
instant
the
interest from
on the collateral.
against lien creditors or secured parties who subsequently effect liens
(1979).
62A.9-303(1)
§
CODE
REV.
WASH.

19791

U. C. C. 1972 Amendments

result is logical, even though A first perfected on January 10,
because from January 2 any other creditor had constructive
knowledge of A's claim to an interest through the operation of
the filing system. (2) As before, A files on January 2. On January
5, B makes his advance and perfects his interest by taking possession of the collateral. Under the 1972 Text A again wins as
first to file or perfect. In both cases, A's priority over B will continue for all future advances that he may make while his filing
40
remains effective.1
In the 1962 Text, however, subsection 9-312(5)(b) contains a
special rule applicable only when one or both of the competing
interests is a pledge or possessory interest. Illogically, a pledge
perfected subsequent to a filing against the same collateral will
defeat the previously filed interest if no credit has been
advanced by the nonpossessory secured party prior to the perfection of the pledge. Consequently, in example (2), B will take priority over A. Of what value is the filing system if a filed financing statement does not protect a creditor against all Code
interests thereafter created in the same preexisting collateral? In
apparent response, this deviant provision was eliminated from
the 1972 Text.
E.

Competing U.C.C. Financiers-PurchaseMoney Security
Interests

Once a debtor has entered into a security agreement
extending to after-acquired property, any subsequent acquisition
of the same type of collateral will immediately be subject to the
security interest. If the secured party has properly filed his
financing statement, under the general rule of subsection
9-312(5)(a), even a credit seller thereafter delivering such property
to the debtor and retaining a security interest to enforce payment
of his purchase price will be subordinate to the earlier interest.
Recognizing that credit sellers contribute new value to the
debtor's estate in the same amount as the value of the security
they claim and therefore do not diminish the assets available to
the holder of the earlier interest, the drafters of Article 9, in
subsection 9-312(3), provided for a special super-priority for
purchase money security interests created under circumstances
described above.
The Code differentiates between purchase money interests
140. U.C.C. § 9-312(7) (1972 version).
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in inventory and purchase money interests in all other collateral.
With respect to the latter, the 1972 Text of subsection 9-312(4)
accords the purchase money interest priority in the collateral
and its identifiable proceeds if perfected before, or within ten
days after, the debtor receives possession of the collateral. With
respect to inventory purchase money security interests, the Code
imposes more stringent conditions and offers a lesser degree of
priority over competing interests arising under after-aquired
property clauses. The holder of a purchase money interest in
inventory must (1) have perfected his interest when the debtor
receives possession of the collateral, which means in practice he
must file his financing statement before making delivery, and (2)
as prescribed in subsection 9-312(3)(b), (c), and (d), he must
notify holders of conflicting after-acquired property interests.
Having met these conditions, the purchase money inventory
financier has priority in the inventory itself. Nevertheless, his
position is somewhat insecure because his priority in the proceeds of sale is limited by the 1972 Text to cash proceeds only,
as defined in subsection 9-306(1).'
Only one reported Washington decision, Manufacturers
Acceptance Corp. v. Penning's Sales, Inc.,' relates to the special priority rules for purchase money interests under subsections
9-312(3) and (4). The narrow holding of the case is that a
purchase money security interest in inventory will be subordinated to the after-acquired property clause of an earlier inventory financier unless the purchase money claimant strictly
and notification requirements of subsecobserves the perfection
4
1
tion 9-312(3).'
So stated, the holding is erroneous because subsection
9-312(3) is intended to govern priority only between the inventory
purchase money interest and a previously perfected claimant to
the same collateral, whose priority would otherwise be established
under subsection 9-312(5)(a), according to which the first to file in
the collateral wins. Subsection 9-312(3) states only that an
141. References to priority in proceeds of the original collateral for the holder of
purchase money interests satisfying § 9-312(3) or (4) first appear in the 1972 Official
Text. These provisions were added to aid in resolving the hotly debated issue of priorities
in proceeds. Neither subsection of the Washington Code mentions proceeds at all. See
text accompanying notes 151-65 infra.
142. 5 Wash. App. 501, 487 P.2d 1053 (1971).
143. Id. at 508-09, 487 P.2d at 1058. Because, however, the conflict between the competing inventory claimants in that case did not involve rights to proceeds, the decision
would not be affected by the 1972 amendments to § 9-313(3) and (4).
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inventory purchase money interest has priority over a conflicting
interest if all of the conditions of the subsection are met. It does
not state that the conflicting interest has priority if the
requirements are not met, as the court's analysis implies."'
Rather, subsection 9-312(5) governs all cases not within the other
subsections of section 9-312, "including cases of purchase money
interests which do not qualify for the special priorities set forth in
subsectons (3) and (4).'
Therefore, if no effective financing
statement has been filed for either the previously existing security
interest or the purchase money interest at the time inventory is
delivered to the debtor, subsection 9-312(3) will' not afford the
purchase money interest priority. Priority, however, will still be
accorded the purchase money interest if its holder files a financing
statement before the holder of the conflicting interest files.
The facts of the Penning's Sales case also raise the question
of whether the secured creditor claiming priority in the inventory
by virtue of his after-acquired property clause had in fact made
an effective filing with respect to the collateral at issue before
the inventory purchase money interest was itself filed. The court
did not explicitly so hold. If the rationale of the opinion is that
such a filing is not necessary on the part of the preexisting
secured creditor, the case is incorrectly decided.
In the course of the transactions involved in Penning'sSales,
the original debtor, a proprietorship under the Penning name,
incorporated under the name of Penning's Sales, Inc. The claimant of the after-acquired property interest had entered into a
security agreement with the proprietorship and filed a financing
statement under the Penning name on July 1, 1967. After the
first financier filed, but before the incorporation, a manufacturer
made an initial shipment of inventory on credit to the debtor.'"
On March 13, 1968, shortly after receipt of this initial shipment,
the incorporation occurred and all subsequent shipments of the
inventory under dispute apparently were made to the corporation. On April 4, 1968, the manufacturer obtained a security
agreement with the corporation and filed a financing statement
covering the inventory. Thereafter, on April 12, 1968, the original
financier entered into a new security agreement with the corpo144. Id. at 509, 487 P.2d at 1058.
145. WASH. REv. CODE § 62A.9-312(5) (1979).
146. The seller originally characterized the relationship as a warehousing arrangement, but the court properly interpreted the transactions as either consignments or credit
sales. 5 Wash. App. at 505-06, 487 P.2d at 1056.
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ration and filed a financing statement. Presumably, both financing statements were filed in the name of the corporation.
Under these facts, the original financier can prevail only if
his filing on July 1, 1967, is effective to perfect an interest in the
inventory subsequently acquired by the new corporation. Assuming substitution of the corporation as debtor in the first
financier's original security agreement, under the after-acquired
property clause the first financier's interest would attach to the
inventory supplied to the corporation by the manufacturer. The
problem arises that upon the substitution the original financing
statement against the proprietorship could not have been found
by a search under the corporate debtor's name.'47 The original
financing statement, therefore, would certainly appear to have
become ineffective, absent the provisions of new subsection
9-402(7), second sentence,' 48 and the interest in new collateral
acquired by the corporation would have been unperfected until
the new April 12 statement was filed under the corporate
debtor's name. The opinion, however, records no finding that the
147. Had the new corporation not been substituted into the original security agreement in place of the proprietorship prior to April 4, there would not even have been any
attachment of the original party's interest to collateral newly acquired by the corporation.
148. The problems of change of name and change of identity of the debtor have been
expressly considered in § 9-402(7) of the 1972 Text. Assuming that a successor debtor,
with the approval of the secured party, had been substituted for the original debtor in
the security agreement so that the security interest could attach to property thereafter
acquired by the successor, under § 9-402(7)(2d sent.), the original secured party would
prevail-under the facts of Penning's Sales. After the original filing in the name of the
proprietorship (the original debtor) had become seriously misleading to the creditors of
the corporation, the 1972 Text would allow a four-month grace period, during which the
original filing would remain effective to perfect the interest in collateral acquired by the
successor, even though the earlier filing could not be found by a search under the
successor's name. Failure to refile in the name of the successor (the corporation) within the
four-month period (which would begin March 13) would result in lapse of the original filing statement and loss of perfection by the first secured party. Filing on April 12, however, would result in continuous perfection and would defeat the April 4th filing by the
second inventory claimant.
Section 9-402(7)(2d sent.), provides only one of several situations in which a filing
statement is effective even though it might not be found by a search under the debtor's
true name. Others are U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(d) and (3)(e) (1972 version) (interstate movement of the collateral or of the debtor's location); id. § 9-401(3) (change in the use governing location of filing); id. § 9-402(7)(3d sent.) (transfer of collateral from the debtor to
third parties after an effective filing has been made); and id. § 10-102(2) (transition provision allowing continued perfection without refiling of interests perfected under pre-Code
law). To maintain the predictability of what third parties must investigate to discover
perfected interests, judicial decisions should not expand these exceptions to the general
rule that a filing should be discoverable under the debtor's name upon a search in the
proper location in the U.C.C. files.
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July 1, 1967, filing continued effective, either because it was not
seriously misleading,' or because the manufacturer had actual
knowledge of a substitution of the corporate debtor into the
financing agreement, which would somehow serve to continue the
earlier filing's perfection of the security interest against him.' 50
The conclusion is inescapable that the court did not fully
appreciate what it was deciding in Penning's Sales.
F. Competing U. C. C. Financiers-Perfectionand Priority in
Proceeds
1. Perfection
A creditor taking a security interest in consumer goods or
equipment generally need not. concern himself about continuation of his interest in proceeds of the original collateral.'" Such
collateral is not bought for resale, and in any event a disposition
is not effective to terminate the security interest, unless the
creditor agrees to a sale free of his interest under subsection
9-306(2), or unless subsection 9-307(2), consumer's resale to a
consumer, applies. With inventory, however, a sale by the debtor
to a buyer in the ordinary course of business terminates the financier's interest in the collateral.'52 To afford the secured party
149. What is "seriously misleading" under § 9-402(7) of the 1972 Text is a question
of fact, dependent on a determination of whether searching creditors should have found
the financing statement. U.C.C. records are generally closed files with no public access.
A
filing clerk upon payment of a search fee will determine whether filings exist under
the
precise name furnished by the searching party; it is not the clerk's job to tell the searching party whether there are filings under similar names. Indeed, who can really decide
what is a similar name? The only reported decision rendered under Washington
law
regarding sufficiency of the debtor's name on a financing statement is Siljeg v. National
Bank of Commerce, 509 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1975), discussed at note 70 supra.
150. There is no provision in Article 9 to cover such a case. The closest provision
would be WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-401(2) (1979), which renders a financing statement
filed in the wrong location (centrally, or locally, or in the real property records) effective
to perfect the interest reported thereon against anyone who has actual knowledge
of the
contents of the financing statement. Section 9-401(2) would not apply, however, because
the interest reported on the financing statement was claimed in the property of the
proprietorship, not the corporation. The inventory involved would never have been property
of the proprietorship.
151. Should the collateral be stolen or destroyed, proceeds of insurance obviously
become important. A 1972 modification to the Official Text of § 9-306(1) makes
clear
* that insurance proceeds constitute proceeds within the meaning of Article 9, resolving
a
point that had been decided adversely to the secured creditor in several court proceedings. See, e.g., Quigley v. Caron, 247 A.2d 94 (Me. 1968); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp.
v.
Prudential Inv. Corp., 101 R.I. 287, 222 A.2d 571 (1966).
152. WASH. REv. CODE § 62A.9-307(1) (1979). As discussed above, under § 9-307(1) a
security interest in farm products is not defeated by sale unless the secured creditor
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continuous protection, at least until the debtor acquires additional inventory, attachment and perfection of his security interest
in the proceeds of sale is essential.
The 1972 Code's regulation of validity and perfection of a
security interest in proceeds of the original collateral clarifies
and simplifies the provisions of the 1962 Text. The 1972 Text
differentiates between "cash" and "noncash" proceeds. Section
9-306(1) defines "money, checks, deposit accounts, and the like"
as cash proceeds; everything else is noncash proceeds.
Under both the 1962 and 1972 Texts the security interest
continues in (and attaches to) any identifiable proceeds on disposition of the original collateral, whether or not the security
agreement so states. 5 3 Furthermore, under both the 1962 and
1972 Texts perfection continues automatically in all proceeds,
regardless of the proceeds character, for ten-days after their
receipt by the debtor. 5 Continued perfection after the initial ten
days under the 1962 Text depends upon affirmative action by the
secured party. Either the original financing statement must
expressly claim perfection in proceeds,' or the creditor must,
within the initial ten-day period after the debtor receives the
proceeds, perfect his interest in them either by a new filing
against the proceeds or by assuming possession of them. Failure
to fulfill one or the other of these requirements causes perfection
in the proceeds to lapse.
Under the 1972 Text, however, once the security interest is
perfected in the original collateral by a properly filed financing
statement, the interest continues automatically perfected
beyond the initial ten-day period. No further action, by the
assents to a sale free of the security interest, but the farm products financier will be
equally as interested in proceeds as the inventory financier if it is not practical to pursue
the buyer of the collateral. See text accompanying notes 133-34 supra.
153. Well-drafted security agreements will specify that the security interest covers
proceeds of the original collateral and, at least in the context of inventory financing, will
list by type each kind of proceeds that may conceivably arise.
154. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-306(3) (1979).
155. To accommodate the secured party, the official form for the financing statement
under the 1962 Text, Form UCC-1, provides a box to be checked if the secured party
claims perfection in proceeds.
Only one reported Washington case has dealt with the claims of a U.C.C. secured
party in proceeds. Ellingsen v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 12 Wash. App. 423, 529 P.2d 1163
(1974). Although the case was decided on other grounds, interestingly the secured party
failed to check the proceeds box. Whether the failure resulted from inadvertence or lack of
appreciation of its significance is, of course, impossible to determine; but the continuing
automatic perfection in proceeds developed in the 1972 Official Text of § 9-306(3)(A) would
seem to comport more closely with the natural expectations of less sophisticated creditors.
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secured party is necessary to be perfected in identifiable cash
proceeds under subsection 9-306(3)(b) and in those noncash proceeds under subsection 9 -306(3)(a) in which an original security
interest would be perfected by a filing in the same location.15
Accounts receivable and chattel paper taken as proceeds of
inventory, probably the two most significant kinds of noncash
proceeds, would be covered under subsection 9 -306(3)(a). 57 Subsection 9-306(3)(a) would also cover trade-ins of used goods
taken as down payment on the purchase price of new goods.' 5"
If continuing perfection in proceeds is not granted automatically under either subsection 9 -306(3)(a) or (b), of the 1972 Text,
then, as explicitly stated in subsection 9 - 3 06(3)(c), perfection in
the proceeds will terminate if the interest is not independently
perfected by filing or possession prior to the end of the initial
ten-day period. This last provision is directed at a troublesome
ambiguity in the Washington Text. Under the 1962 Text of subsection 9-306(3) a security interest in an instrument taken by the
debtor as proceeds on the sale of original collateral is perfected
indefinitely by the original filing, that is, by checking the financing statement's proceeds box, despite the clear insistence on possessory interests in instruments stated in Official Comment 1 to
section 9-304.59 Thus, under the 1972 Official Text, continued
156. Although § 9 - 3 0 6(3)(a) and (b) of the 1972 Text generally absolve the financier
of the necessity of specifically claiming proceeds on the original financing statement,
one
situation exists in which such a claim to proceeds must be made: if the secured
party
wishes to trace his security interest into noncash proceeds that are of a type other
than
the original collateral and that were acquired by using cash proceeds from the disposition
of the original collateral. U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(a) (1972 version). Such a case, for example,
would be an inventory financier's claim to equipment acquired through the use
of cash
proceeds generated by the sale of inventory covered in the security agreement.
The
secured party would be required to add such language as "equipment claimed
as proceeds" to his financing statement.
Although the rule of § 9 -306(3)(a) of the 1972 Code, or checking the proceeds box
on
the financing statement under the 1962 Code, will perfect a security interest in
chattel
paper or negotiable documents taken as proceeds, a possessory security interest in
collateral of this nature may still defeat the perfected proceeds interest. As previously
mentioned, a possessory interest in chattel paper may cut off interests claimed in the
paper as
proceeds under § 9-308. See text accompanying notes 25-26 supra. Likewise § 9-309
recognizes the rights of a holder of a negotiable document to whom the document
has been
duly negotiated; he will cut off the interest of a claimant to the document as collateral
or
as proceeds. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 62A.7-501(4), .7-502 (1979).
157. See also U.C.C. § 9-401(1) (1972 version).
158. See Howarth v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 203 F. Supp. 279 (W.D.
Pa.
1962).
159. The third and fourth sentences of Official Comment 1 to § 9-304(1) read
as
follows:
With respect to instruments subsection (1) [of § 9-3041 provides that, except
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perfection in instruments taken as proceeds will require the
secured party to assume possession within ten days after their
receipt by the debtor. 6 '
2.

Priority

The 1962 Text contains no express provision determining
priority among conflicting security interests when the collateral
in question is proceeds of the original collateral of one or more of
the claimants. Conflicting claims in proceeds may occur in either
of two principal cases. (1) Creditor A holds a perfected security
interest in debtor's inventory and proceeds, and Creditor B has a
perfected interest in debtor's accounts. Creditor B's accounts are
necessarily proceeds of the sale of creditor A's inventory. (2)
Creditor A sells property on credit and retains a purchase money
security interest in the collateral, fulfilling the requirements of
subsection 9-312(3) or (4), as applicable, to obtain a super-priority in the original collateral over Creditor B, who had previously
obtained and properly filed a security interest with an afteracquired property clause in the same type of collateral. Upon
disposition of the original collateral, will Creditor A's super-priority under subsection 9-312(3) or (4) continue into proceeds?
for cases of "temporary perfection" covered in subsections (4) and (5), taking
possession is the only available method; this provision follows the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act. The rule is based on the thought that where the collateral
consists of instruments, it is universal practice for the secured party to take
possession of them in pledge; any surrender of possession to the debtor is for a
short time; therefore it would be unwise to provide the alternative of perfection
for a long period by filing which, since it in no way corresponds with commercial practice, would serve no useful purpose.
This Official Comment remains unchanged from the 1962 to the 1972 Texts.
160. Section 9-306(4) defines the extent of the secured party's interest in proceeds in
the event of the debtor's bankruptcy, including allowance for limited tracing of cash proceeds into commingled bank accounts, while § 9-306(5) provides for reestablishment of
the secured party's original security interest in the original collateral should it be
returned to, or repossessed by, the debtor or his financier upon the cancellation of a sales
transaction. Minor changes have been made in the 1972 Text of § 9-306(4) for purposes of
clarification only; no changes are proposed in § 9-306(5).
The limits of the secured party's right to pursue cash proceeds into commingled
accounts upon the debtor's bankruptcy are discussed in In re Gibson Prods., 543 F.2d 652
(9th Cir. 1976). The secured party may assert a perfected interest only in those proceeds
that he can actually trace into the commingled accounts. The Gibson case, although
decided with reference to the Arizona U.C.C., applies equally to Washington law, and, as
the court pointed out, the changes in the 1972 Text of § 9-306(4) would affect no change
in the secured party's rights in commingled accounts against the bankruptcy trustee. Id.
at 655. Nor will the adoption of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 affect the holding in
Gibson. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547 (West 1979).
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Proper resolution of these two cases, particularly the former,
has generated one of the greatest scholarly debates'' about the
effects of the 1962 Text. Certainty of result is the essence of
secured financing. The practical way to avoid the uncertainty of
the first case is for the prospective financier to refuse a loan on
inventory or accounts when an earlier interest in either is on file.
The general absence of litigation on this first case, both in Washington and elsewhere, indicates that the financing community
recognized early the uncertainty under the 1962 Text and acted
accordingly.
To settle the first unresolved priority problem, the 1972 Text
added subsection 9-312(6).162 Pursuant to this subsection, the
general rule of subsection 9-312(5) is extended to proceeds. Thus,
the first financier to file in either inventory or accounts will in
fact prevail in the accounts. In particular, an accounts receivable
financier need not worry under the 1972 Code that a subsequent
inventory claimant could defeat his interest in accounts. "3
The second situation usually arises when a borrower
exhausts the line of credit from its inventory or accounts
financier and approaches a supplier to sell on credit against the
retention of a purchase money security interest. Regardless of
whether the credit purchase and grant of a purchase money
interest is a breach of the agreement with the original
financier,"' the question remains whether the purchase money
interest's super-priority in the original collateral conferred under
subsection 9-312(3) or (4) should extend to proceeds as against
the preexisting financier. By appropriate changes in the lan161. See, e.g., Henson, "Proceeds" Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 COLUM.
L. REv. 232 (1965); Weiss, Original Collateraland Proceeds: A Code Puzzle, 42 N.Y.IJ.L.
REv. 785 (1967). See also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 80, § 25-4, at 909.
Professor Henson, a member of the special Article 9 Review Committee created in
1966, argued that a proceeds interest under the 1962 Text should be considered as initially perfected automatically under § 9-306(3), rather than as a result of the filing of a
financing statement with a claim to proceeds. As a result, he argues that U.C.C.
§ 9-312(5)(a) (1962 version) does not apply, and, therefore, that the inventory financier's
interest, arising earlierin the financing cycle, should receive priority, even over the interest
of a previously filed accounts financier, notwithstanding that perfection of both
claimants would occur at the same instant, i.e., the moment when the common debtor first
received rights in the proceeds. Henson, supra.
162. Subsection 9-312(6) of the 1972 Text reads: "For purposes of subsection (5) a
date of filing or perfection as to collateral is also a date of filing or perfection as to
proceeds."
163. See Henson, supra note 161.
164. A well-drafted security agreement will contain a clause prohibiting the creation
of any conflicting interest in any of the collateral claimed by the secured party; violation
of this covenant will constitute default and will enable the secured party to seize the
collateral or resort to other remedies, but will not invalidate the conflicting interest.
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guage of subsection 9-312(3), the 1972 Text expressly limits the
super-priority of the purchase money inventory financier in proceeds to cash proceeds, so that the financier will be subject to
the general rule of subsection 9-312(5), as supplemented by subsection 9-312(6), for noncash proceeds, including accounts. Consequently, the inventory financier will not enjoy priority in the
accounts generated by sale of the inventory he financed over
either a preexisting, properly perfected financier, or preexisting, properly perfected accounts receivable financier."'
G.

Perfection in Fixtures-Priorityover Conflicting Real
Estate Interests

1.

The Problem

Goods may become so attached to real estate that they are
subject to liens and other interests arising under real property
law. Sometimes, as with building materials, they become so integrated into a structure that they lose their identity as personal
property. Frequently, as with heavy machinery or appliances,
goods may be bolted down or otherwise firmly installed but still
removable. Goods in such cases retain their identity as items of
personal property while at the same time are subject to real
property law. Goods which exhibit these dual characteristics are
called "fixtures." Although Article 9 does not precisely define'
67
when goods become fixtures (this is left to noncode state law),'
it authorizes the creation, or continuation, of personal property
security interests in goods that are, or will become, fixtures and
establishes a set of rules regulating priority in fixtures between
conflicting real property and Article 9 personal property
interests.
Priority among real estate interests, generally speaking, is
measured from the time of recording in an index maintained in
each county under the respective laws of each state. To determine whether superior claims to the real estate exist, a prospec165. In contrast to its treatment of the purchase money inventory financier, the 1972
Text expressly extends the § 9-312(4) super-priority of purchase money financiers of all
other types of collateral to proceeds of all sorts. In effect, however, § 9-312(4) protects
very little other than purchase money security interests in equipment. An after-acquired
property clause covering consumer goods is essentially prohibited by § 9-204(2), and farm
products are normally produced and not purchased.
166. The 1972 Text defines fixtures as goods that have "become so related to particular real estate that an interest in them arises under real estate law." U.C.C.
§ 9-313(1)(a) (1972 version).
167. WASH. R v. CoDE § 62A.9-313(1)(2d sent.) (1979).
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tive buyer or mortgagee will consult this index, just as buyers or
financiers of personal property will consult the U.C.C. filing indices. To perfect a personal property fixture interest against a
claimant of a real estate interest, the Code prescribes a local
filing in the office where a mortgage on the same real estate
would be filed.' This procedure was designed to prevent unfair
surprise to claimants of real estate interests. The financing statement for such a filing must include sufficient information concerning the real estate on which the fixtures are or will be
located so that the financing statement can be indexed properly
to accommodate a real property record search." 9
The priority rules for conflicts between real property and
personal property interests in fixtures, as well as the effects of
filing or failing to file as a fixture interest, are set forth in section
9-313. As between two personal property or U.C.C. security
interests in goods which are fixtures, the rules set out in section
9-312 will continue to govern.
2.

The 1962 Text of Section 9-313

Under the 1962 Text of section 9-313, any personal property
security interest attaching to goods that are or subsequently
become fixtures has priority in the goods over all conflicting real
property interests in the real estate upon which the goods are or
become fixtures, with two exceptions. The first exception, set out
168. Id. § 62A.9-401(1)(b). Under the 1972 Text a fixture filing is intended as a supplemental means of perfection to insure protection against real estate purchasers and
mortgagees. A proper nonfixture filing is sufficient to perfect a U.C.C. interest in goods,
whether fixtures or not, against other U.C.C. secured parties and all judicial lien creditors of the debtor. No distinction is made between creditors whose liens attach to the
collateral as personal property and creditors whose liens attach to the real property on
which the fixtures may be located. The intent of this rule is to prevent.attack by the
trustee of the debtor in a subsequent bankruptcy from defeating a U.C.C. fixture interest
which has been perfected but not fixture filed. U.C.C. § 9-313, Official Comment 3 (1972
version).
Under the 1962 Text, in contrast, the failure to perfect as a fixture, if in fact the
goods are fixtures, results in exposure of the secured party to loss of his collateral to the
debtor's trustee in bankruptcy pursuant to the interaction of the language of
§ 9-313(4)(b) of the 1962 Text with § 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and § 544(a)(1) of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. See text accompanying note 171 infra.
169. The precise information is set forth in § 9-402(5) of the 1972 Text. Although
the clear intent of the 1962 Text is that a fixture filing should be indexed in the local
jurisdiction, the statute does not expressly state this. Language has been added in the
1972 version of § 9-403(7) directing the local official to file a fixture financing statement
(as well as financing statements for timber or mineral interests) as if it were a real
estate conveyance; § 9-402(5) of the 1972 Text calls for information to be furnished on the
financing statement to enable the local official to accomplish this.
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in subsection 9-313(3), recognizes the priority of a competing real
estate interest that attaches to the goods as fixtures before the
personal property interest attaches, a simple "first in time is first
in priority" rule.
The second and much more important exception, subsection
9-313(4), protects the integrity of the real estate recording system by granting priority to certain real estate claimants who
obtain their interests after the personal property interest
attaches, but before it has been perfected by a fixture filing. Pursuant to the 1962 Text, an attached but unperfected U.C.C.
interest in fixtures is defeated by (1) a purchaser for value of an
interest in the real estate, (2) a preexisting real estate mortgagee to the extent he advances new value after the attachment
and before the fixture filing of the personal property security
interest, and (3) a creditor obtaining a judicial lien upon the real
estate. As with the 1962 Text of subsection 9-301(1), priority in
each case is also conditioned upon the real estate claimant having no actual knowledge of the off-record U.C.C. interest.7 0
Inclusion of judicial lien creditors among the parties protected by subsection 9-313(4) of the 1962 Text against fixture
interests not fixture filed was a serious drafting error. Judicial
lien creditors place no reliance on the real estate records nor
advance any new value to the debtor when obtaining their liens.
Far more significantly, however, inclusion of judicial lien creditors within the protected group of subsection 9-313(4) affords the
trustee of the debtor in a subsequent bankruptcy a basis to
defeat a nonfixture filed fixture interest by virtue of his status as
a judgment lien creditor,"' should it be determined that the
goods are fixtures at bankruptcy.7 2 Such is the case even if the
goods were originally not fixtures and the security interest was
originally and properly perfected as a nonfixture interest, and
even if the debtor affixed the goods to the real estate without the
170. Reference to actual knowledge is eliminated in the 1972 Text of § 9-313, rendering the statute a "pure race" rather than a "race-notice" statute, consistent with the
changes in § 9-301. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
171. 11 U.S.C.A. § 544(a) (West 1979). Bankruptcy proceedings filed prior to October 1, 1979, would be subject to the 1898 Bankruptcy Act. Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 403, 92 Stat. 2683 (1978). Under the 1898 Act, however, the
trustee would still be able to assert judgment lien creditor status. 11 U.S.C. § 110(c)
(1976) (repealed 1978).
172. The reverse is also true: fixture filing of what is determined at bankruptcy to be
a nonfixture interest renders the security interest subject to defeat. In re Park Corrugated
Box Corp., 249 F. Supp. 56 (D.N.J. 1966). This result will continue under the 1972 Text
and the new Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
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knowledge or against the wishes of the secured party.' As a consequence, a well-advised financier of any collateral that conceivably could become fixtures will file twice under the 1962 Code,
once as a nonfixture interest and again as a fixture interest, to
insure complete protection in the collateral.'74
3.

The 1972 Text of Section 9-313

To eliminate these and other difficulties, and to seek greater
acceptance of section 9-313 among real estate financing groups,' 75
fundamental changes to that section have been made in the 1972
Text. The most significant of these changes are: (1) restatement
of the general priority rule of section 9-313 in terms of perfection,
rather than attachment, of the personal property interest; (2)
definition of the term "fixture filing,"' 176 and clarification of its
effects; (3) introduction of a degree of conscious parallelism
between the priority rules of section 9-313 and those of subsections 9-312(4) and (5); and (4) recognition of a real property
analogy to a purchase money security interest, the "construction
mortgage,"' 77 and guarantee of its priority over conflicting, subsequently recorded personal property purchase money security
interests.
173. Although the risk of successful intervention of the bankruptcy trustee against a
security interest perfected other than by fixture filing when the goods are later determined to be fixtures is of substantial practical importance, there is a paucity of case law
on the subject. In one reported bankruptcy case, involving a U.C.C. fixture claimant who
had perfected only by a nonfixture filing and who was seeking priority in the fixtures over
a real estate mortgagee after the common debtor's bankruptcy, the U.C.C. claimant prevailed and the trustee did not even intervene, notwithstanding the U.C.C. financier's
apparent exposure under § 9-313(4) of the 1962 Code. In re Chase Laundry & Drycleaning
Co., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 975 (1976).
174. In a complex transaction some question may arise as to where the financing
statement should be filed to perfect the secured party's interest. While there is only one
proper location for any transaction (except in some situations in states selecting
§ 9-401(1), alternative three), multiple copies of the financing statement can routinely
be filed to assure the proper location has been covered. There is no penalty for multiple
filing, only multiple filing fees. But the penalty for failure to file may include loss of the
secured party's collateral.
175. Although adopted in most states, § 9-313 of the 1962 Text was omitted or substantially modified in a significant minority of states, including California.
176. U.C.C. § 9-313(1)(b) (1972 version) states: "[A] 'fixture filing' is the filing in
the office where a mortgage on the real estate would be filed or recorded of a financing
statement covering goods which are or are to become fixtures and conforming to the
requirements of subsection (5) of Section 9-402."
177. Id. § 9-313(1)(c) states: "[A] mortgage is a 'construction mortgage' to the extent
that it secures an obligation incurred for the construction of an improvement on land
including the acquisition cost of the land, if the recorded writing so indicates."
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Under section 9-313 of the 1972 Text, the basic rule is that,
subject only to two exceptions, an unperfected U.C.C. interest is
subordinate to any conflicting real estate claimant (other than
the debtor who created the U.C.C. interest). " s The two exceptions, contained in subsections 9-313(5)(a) and (b), relate to (1)
voluntary subordination or relinquishment of his claim to the
fixture by the real estate claimant and (2) fixtures which are
property of a lessee or other user of the real estate who is entitled
by non-Code law to remove them from the real estate as against
the real estate claimant. This change in the general rule of section 9-313 alters the entire structure of fixture priorities. The section is no longer biased in favor of the personal property security
interest; rather, it now follows the pattern of subsection 9-312(5),
that the first interest filed for record generally prevails. This is
confirmed by new section 9-313(4)(b): having perfected by
fixture filing, a U.C.C. financier has priority in the fixtures over
any subsequently recorded real estate interest in the same
property.
Section 9-313 also continues, subject to one very important
exception, the policy of subsection 9-312(4), protecting a
purchase money security interest from claims to the collateral by
preexisting creditors of the debtor. Thus, under subsection
9-313(4)(a), a purchase money interest in goods which will become
fixtures is protected against a preexisting real estate financier's
fixture interest under an after-acquired fixture clause if a fixture
filing is accomplished before the goods become fixtures. If the
fixture fillng also meets the criterion of subsection 9-312(4) that
filing be accomplished before, or within ten days after, the debtor
acquires possession of the goods, the single fixture filing also gives
the purchase money fixture financier priority over preexisting
U.C.C. personal property security interests in the same goods. The
exception to subsection 9-313(4)(a), fixture purchase money
priority, is in favor of a prior recorded construction mortgage
under subsection 9-313(6). The purpose of this provision is to
recognize that a construction mortgage is itself in the nature of a
purchase money interest, and that advances made by the
construction mortgagee may be intended to fund the purchase of
the same items being sought on credit from the prospective U.C.C.
purchase money financier. The practical effect of the construction
mortgage priority is, of course, to force the prospective U.C.C.
178. Id. § 9-313(7).
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purchase money fixture financier to contact construction
mortgagees of record and to obtain either a subordination
agreement covering the fixtures he plans to finance or a direct
commitment from the mortgagee to pay for the fixture prior to
installation.
Section 9-313 of the 1972 Text also contains provisions to
protect a U.C.C. fixture interest against competing real estate
claims in two instances in which perfection has been achieved
Both instances recognize the
other than by fixture filing.'
imprecise nature of the legal rules determining what sort of
attachment to real property renders personal property a fixture,
as well as the lack of control which a financier has over such
attachment. The first instance is provided in subsection
9-313(4)(c), governing readily removable office or factory machines and replacement"" home appliances that are consumer
goods. If the security interest has been perfected under the Code
prior to the goods becoming fixtures, priority of the U.C.C. interest is guaranteed. The practical problem, of course, is what the
words "readily removable" mean. Clearly, a cautious U.C.C.
equipment or consumer goods financier may still decide to file
his interest twice to avoid controversy under the 1972 Text
about the meaning of "readily removable." By doing so, he is
fully protected, whether his collateral becomes fixtures or not.
The second instance deals with the problem of creditors
with conflicting judicial liens on the real property to which a
fixture is attached. Reversing the rule of subsection 9-313(4) of
the 1962 Text, new subsection 9-313(4)(d) states that a personal
property security interest in fixtures perfected by any method
proper under Article 9 will prevail over a subsequently obtained
judicial lien on the real estate. The purpose is, of course, to protect the security interest which has been perfected by a proper
nonfixture filing, but not by a fixture filing, from being defeated
by the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy, if the debtor should affix
the goods to his land. Subsection 9-313(4) of the 1972 Text effectively forecloses the trustee's power under the Bankruptcy Act of
1898 to defeat a U.C.C. fixture interest that has been perfected
179. In practice, perfection will usually have been accomplished by a central or local
filing as equipment or consumer goods or automatically in the case of a purchase money
interest in consumer goods.
180. Replacement home appliances are specified because originally installed consumer appliances frequently will be covered under a construction mortgage.
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either by a fixture filing or by a proper nonfixture filing.'"'
Unfortunately, the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 may reopen the way for the trustee to defeat a
U.C.C. fixture interest which has not been fixture filed prior to
the debtor's bankruptcy. Under subsection 544(a)(3) of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act, the trustee is granted for the first time
a power to avoid any transaction that may be defeated by a bona
fide purchaser of the debtor's real estate at the moment of bankruptcy. Probably intended to supplement the trustee's powers to
cut off unrecorded deeds, mortgages, and other equitable interests in states where the real estate recording act does not benefit
a judicial lien creditor,'8 2 the new provision clearly applies under
181. Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, there also exists the possibility of a trustee's
challenge, even under the provisions of the 1972 Text, to a perfected but nonfixture-filed
fixture interest as a voidable preference under § 60(a) and (b). 11 U.S.C. § 96(a), (b)
(1976). Because no reported cases under § 9-313 have advanced such an argument, it is
uncertain whether this attack might have been successful. Under § 60(a)(2), an interest
in real property may be defeated by the trustee if it may be defeated by a bona fide
purchaser, and a fixture interest not filed as a fixture filing is vulnerable to a purchaser
under § 9-313(7). Of course, the trustee would also have the burden of proof that the
secured party had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent. Id.
The avenue of attack against the perfected but nonfixture-filed interest as a preferential transfer has been specifically cut off by § 547(e)(1)(A) and (B) of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, which provides that an interest in fixtures cannot be defeated by the
trustee once it has been perfected against a lien creditor. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(e)(1)(A), (B)
(West 1979). The rule of § 9-313(4)(d), therefore, would suffice to protect the perfected
but nonfixture-filed fixture interest against the claim that it is a preference under the
new act.
182. The general common law rule is that a judicial lien creditor, unlike bona fide
purchasers or mortgagees, is not protected by state real property recording acts against
latent defects affecting his debtor's title to land, unless the legislature has extended the
recording statute to cover judicial lien creditors. Therefore, absent such protection, the
judicial lien creditor is subject to all unrecorded instruments and off-record equities that
would be superior to the debtor's own interest in the land. Likewise the bankruptcy trustee. using his power as a judicial lienor under § 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, cannot defeat these interests in bankuptcy proceedings applying the law of states, such as
Washington, which do not include judicial lien creditors among the parties protected by
the recording act. See WASH. REv. CODE § 65.08.070 (1979); Fales Co. v. Seiple Co., 171
Wash. 630, 19 P.2d 118 (1933) (receiver in bankruptcy, as neither a bona fide purchaser
nor a mortgagee, cannot defeat unrecorded deed). The trustee's only attack on an unrecorded instrument under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 would be as a preference under §
60, which requires proof of the knowledge of the debtor's insolvency on the 'part of the
owner of the off-record interest. 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1976) (repealed 1978). The language of
§ 544(a)(3) of the new act can thus be explained as merely an extension of the trustee's
powers previously available under § 70(c) to permit the trustee to avoid off-record interests in states such as Washington. It has the unfortunate effect, however, of voiding properly perfected, but nonfixture-filed, U.C.C. fixture interests as well, as as pointed out in the
text of this article. A change in § 544(a)(3) to conform with § 547(a)(1)(A) and (B) can be
expected as one of the initial technical amendments to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978.
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the rule of subsection 9-313(7) to perfected but nonfixture-filed
U.C.C. fixture interests as well. The inclusion of such a power
without an exception for U.C.C. fixture interests, in the face of
other newly enacted language in subsection 547(e)(1)(A) and (B)
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act specifically protecting a properly
perfected but nonfixture-filed fixture interest from attack as a
preferential transfer, seems strange indeed and well may be a
legislative error. But until such time as subsection 544(a)(3) is
amended, a secured party can obtain complete protection for an
interest in goods that may become fixtures only by a dual filing.
VII.
A.

MULTISTATE PROBLEMS

Choice of Law in General

The preceding discussion presumes that each transaction
has occurred entirely within a single jurisdiction. The U.C.C.,
however, is state law, and, by the very fact that its subject matter is more or less moveable, many transactions relate to more
than one state. Rather than leave resolution of the applicable
law in situations involving contact with more than one jurisdiction to the common law of conflicts, the Code contains a general
choice of law provision,' and special provisions in Article 9
relating to security interests in multistate situations. These latter provisions are contained in section 9-103 of the 1972 Text,
and in section 9-103, in conjunction with section 9-102, in the
1962 Text.
Although there are substantial differences between the Article 9 choice of law provisions adopted in Washington and those
present in the 1972 Text, the core common to both relates to two
essential matters: (1) determining the jurisdiction according to
the laws of which the initial perfection or nonperfection of a
security interest will be measured, and (2) determining the effect
on perfection should the location of the collateral that determined initial perfection shift into a new jurisdiction. Because
perfection or nonperfection bears upon the rights of third parties, these two questions require answers that can be obtained
with certainty by persons who are not parties to the security agreement. Fixed rules are required to lend predictability; they tell the
parties where to file and others where to look.
The principal differences between the 1962 and 1972 Texts
183. WASH. REv. CODE § 62A.1-105 (1979).
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in the multistate transaction, or choice of law, rules relate to the

scope of the special Article 9 choice of law rules in relation to the
applicability of the general rule of section 1-105. The 1972 Article 9 choice of law rules are restricted solely to the previously
mentioned questions of perfection, matters relating to protection
of third-party interests. All other choice of law questions (i.e.,
questions arising out of the agreement) are subsumed under the
general rule of section 1-105, which allows the parties to choose
the applicable law, and in the absence of choice, directs the
contacts" analysis to
court to apply a modified "significant
54
law.
appropriate
the
determine
The 1962 provisions, by contrast, significantly curtail the
applicability of the general choice of law rule of section 1-105.
Subsection 9-102(1) of the 1962 Text contains the statement,
deleted in the 1972 Text, that "this Article applies so far as concerns any personal property and fixtures within the jurisdiction
of this state. . . ." Although uncertainty surrounds the meaning
of this provision, ' it is generally accepted as a mandatory choice
of law rule requiring application of forum law when that is the
location of the collateral."" In addition, the multistate rules in
the 1962 Text of section 9-103 apply to questions of validity, as
"7 Under the
well as of perfection, of the security interest.
U.C.C., validity is an undefined concept the scope of which is
open to question. The word can be interpreted narrowly to mean
only formal requisites or broadly to include non-Code substantive law. Regardless of the term's interpretation, it deals with
184. Subsection (1) of § 1-105 reads:
Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation the parties
may agree that the law either of this state or of such other state or nation shall
govern their rights and duties. Failing such agreement this Title applies to
transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state.
Id. § 62A.1-105(1). Subsection (2) provides for the applicability of special conflicts rules,
such as §§ 9-102 and 9-103 of the 1962 Text, and § 9-103 of the 1972 Text, to supersede
the general rule of § 1-105(1).
185. For a recent overview of the difficulties in interpreting the choice of law rules of
§§ 9-102 and 9-103 of the 1962 Text, see Juenger, Nonpossessory Security Interests in
American Conflicts Law, 26 AM. J. CoMP. L. (Supp.) 145, 156-61 (1978).
186. Official Comment 3 to the 1962 Text of § 9-102 provides in part:
In general this Article adopts the position, implicit in prior law, that the
law of the state where the collateral is located should be the governing law,
without regard to possible contacts in other jurisdictions . . . . This "narrow"
approach, appropriate in the field of security transactions, should be contrasted
with the broad approach stated in Section 1-105 with reference to the applicability of the Act as a whole.
187. WASH. REv. CODE § 62A.9-103(2) (1979).
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matters between the parties, and its inclusion within section
9-103 impinges on the parties' freedom to contract on choice of
law where no substantial countervailing third-party interest is
served.
B.

Perfection in Multistate Transactions

Section 9-103 prescribes, in effect, that the law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is located at the moment when
perfection is claimed to have occurred will govern whether the
interest is or is not perfected. The drafters of Article 9 realized,
however, that no single rule is able adequately to fix the location
of all kinds of collateral. Accordingly, section 9-103 of the 1972
Text divides collateral into five mutually exclusive categories for
the purpose of determining applicable law in multijurisdictional
transactions. Of these, two do not warrant separate treatment in
an introductory survey;'8 8 the other three categories, (1) documents, instruments, and "ordinary goods,"' 8 (2) goods covered
by a certificate of title on which liens must be recorded,9 0 and
(3) accounts, general intangibles, and "mobile goods,""' require
elaboration. For purposes of determining the place for perfection,
the location of collateral in each of these three classes can be
generalized as (1) the situs of the collateral, (2) the place of issue
of the certificate of title, and (3) the domicile of the debtor,
respectively.
The categories of section 9-103 of the 1972 Text represent
only one major modification from those in the 1962 Text. The
1972 Text prescribes only one location rule for all intangible collateral;' 2 in contrast, accounts, together with contract rights,
form a category separate from general intangibles and mobile
goods under the 1962 Text. The location of accounts and contract rights under the earlier text is defined as the jurisdiction
188. These categories are (1) chattel paper under § 9-103(4); and (2) minerals and
related accounts under § 9-103(5). The multistate perfection rules for documents, instruments, and ordinary goods apply to possessory interests in chattel paper while the rules
for accounts apply to nonpossessory interests in chattel paper. Minerals are not goods
until removed from the earth. Security interests attaching at the mine mouth can be
perfected only in the jurisdiction where the mine mouth is located. Neither chattel paper
nor minerals are separately treated in the 1962 Code; therefore, they fall into the residual
category of § 9-103(3) in the 1962 Text.
189. U.C.C. § 9-103(1) (1972 version).
190. Id. § 9-103(2).
191. Id. § 9-103(3).
192. Id.
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where the office containing the debtor's books is located. Because
under the 1962 Text a contract right may mature into a general
intangible, by prescribing different rules for determining the
location of, and hence the place to perfect interests in, contract
rights and general intangibles, the authors of the 1962 Code committed a drafting blunder'" that the 1972 Text remedies.
Except for the deletion of references to validity and the consolidation of all intangible property into one class, the changes in
section 9-103 represent primarily an effort to present a more
complete and more intelligible statement of rules already con94
tained in, or derived by the courts from, the 1962 Text.' The
most conspicuous 1972 Text additions are explicit language in
subsections 9-103(2) and (3) establishing rules for continuing
perfection of existing interests when the location of intangible
collateral or collateral subject to a title certificate is moved from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Also, subsection 9-103(3) of the 1962
Text relating to ordinary goods, documents, and instruments has
been rewritten to clarify the rules for initial perfection and for
continuing perfection of existing interests when the collateral
changes
Withlocation.
but one exception, perfection of a security interest in
ordinary goods,' 95 documents, and instruments"' is governed by
the law of the jurisdiction that is the situs of the collateral at the
moment "the last event occurs on which is based the assertion
that the security interest is perfected or unperfected."'" The law
193. A perfected interest in contract rights may be converted into an unperfected
security interest in general intangibles if the debtor's chief place of business is located in
a state other than that in which his records concerning the contract rights are kept,
unless the secured party also files a financing statement in general intangibles in the
state of the debtor's chief place of business before the debtor completes performance on
the contract from which the rights arise. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
194. See, e.g., Associates Realty Credit Ltd. v. Brune, 89 Wash. 2d 6, 568 P.2d 787
(1977) (interpreting WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-103(3) (1979)); Morris v. Seattle-First
Nat'l Bank, 10 Wash. App. 129, 516 P.2d 1055 (1973) (interpreting WASH. REV. CODE
§ 62A.9-103(3), (4) (1979)).
195. Ordinary goods are defined by exclusion as the residuum of goods which are
neither mobile nor covered by a certificate of title. U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(a) (1972 version).
196. The same rule also applies to a possessory security interest in chattel paper. Id.
§ 9-103(4) (1972 version); see note 188 supra.
197. U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(b) (1972 version). Perfection requires that all steps for
attachment, id. § 9-203(1), have occurred and that filing or taking possession, if required,
has been accomplished. Id. § 9-303. Should a secured party prefile in the debtor's goods
in state A while they are located in that state, but the goods are removed to state B
before the creditor makes his initial advance of value, then the last event determining
perfection would occur while the goods are in state B. In such a case the filing in state A
would not perfect an interest in the collateral.

19791
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of this jurisdiction continues to govern perfection until the collateral is removed from the jurisdiction. If collateral subject to a
perfected security interest is moved into another U.C.C. jurisdiction, the second jurisdiction will accord the security interest
automatic perfection in the collateral for four months or such
shorter period as perfection continues in the first jurisdiction
while the collateral remains in the second jurisdiction.' Perfection in the second jurisdiction will lapse at the end of this period
of initial automatic perfection unless the secured party perfects
his interest in the second jurisdiction according to its laws.' If
he does so, perfection in the second jurisdiction continues thereafter without interruption. 2"0 In the case of a nonpossessory
security interest, this means, of course, filing a proper financing
statement in the second jurisdiction or repossessing the collateral, unless the security interest is a purchase money interest in
consumer goods perfected without filing. In this last case, perfection continues beyond the initial four-month period without fur20
ther creditor action. '
The exception to the rule of subsection 9-103(1)(b) is the
case of an interstate credit sale, in which a purchase money
financier understands at the time of sale that the goods immediately will be moved to another jurisdiction. In this case, perfection and priority of the security interest will be measured by the
law of the jurisdiction of intended destination for the first thirty
days after the security interest attaches and thereafter, if the
goods arrive in that jurisdiction within the thirty days.2 02 The
198. Id. § 9-103(1)(d). Perfection in the first jurisdiction might expire before the
goods have been present four months in the second. For example, filing remains valid for
only five years unless a continuation statement is filed. Id. § 9-403(2).
199. Id. § 9-103(1)(d)(i).
200. Id. § 9-103(1)(d)(ii).
201. Of course, unless perfected by filing in the second jurisdiction, a purchase
money security interest in consumer goods is defeated by a consumer buying without
actual knowledge of the interest. Id. § 9-307(2). A previous filing in the first jurisdiction
will protect against a consumer buyer in the second jurisdiction for only four months. Id.
§ 9-103(1)(d)(iii).
202. While 30 days may be a reasonable period for the normal transit of goods
nationwide, the rule of § 9-103(1)(c) (and the corresponding rule of § 9-103(3) of the 1962
Text) speaks of 30 days from the date of attachment of the interest, not from the date
of seller's shipment.
A purchase money interest will attach as soon as the conditions of § 9-203(1) are
met; thus a purchase money interest may attach before the goods are shipped, particularly if the purchase money financier is a third party. See id. § 9-107. The contract
among the parties may call for the advance of the purchase price directly to the seller
prior to shipment, and the buyer-debtor will acquire property rights in the goods sufficient for the fulfillment of § 9-203(1)(c) as soon as the goods are identified to the sales

62

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 3:1

effect of this provision is that a purchase money financier will be
accorded the super-priorities of subsections 9-312(3) or (4) and
9-313(4)(a), as applicable, at the place of destination (assuming
it is a U.C.C. jurisdiction) if he follows the requisites of those
03
sections, including timely filing at the destination. Filing elsewhere will not perfect the security interest if, in fact, the goods
arrive within the thirty-day span after the attachment of the
purchase money interest.
20
Accounts, general intangibles, and mobile goods ' under the
1972 Text are deemed located in the jurisdiction where the
5
debtor has his place of business,20 if he has one, or his residence,
7
if he does not,"' and it is this law which governs perfection.2 In
the event of a change in the debtor's location to another U.C.C.
jurisdiction, perfection in the new jurisdiction will continue
automatically for four months on the basis of the earlier perfection in the first jurisdiction. But this perfection, under subsection 9-103(3)(e), will lapse if filing has not occurred in the second
5
jurisdiction prior to the expiration of the four months.2
contract. Id. § 2-501(1). Thus, delays in transit or the attachment of the interest before
shipment may cause the 30-day period to be exceeded. If such is the case, § 9-103(1)(c)
no longer applies, and perfection will be measured by the general rule of § 9-103(1)(b),
the location of the goods when the last act in the attempted perfection occurs-most
likely the jurisdiction in which the seller is located. Therefore, if there is doubt as to
whether the goods will arrive at the destination within the allowed time of § 9-103(c), the
financier should file in the seller's jurisdiction, as well as in the buyer's jurisdiction, to
perfect under § 9-103(b).
203. Perfection at the destination, if § 9-103(1)(c) applies, will presumably also
grant automatic perfection similar to that under § 9-103(1)(d) in each of the U.C.C. jurisdictions through which the goods pass during the 30 days on their way to the destination,
although the statute is silent on this point.
204. Mobile goods are defined as goods that are not subject to certificate of title laws
of a type normally used in more than one jurisdiction. A nonexhaustive list of examples
given by the statute itself in § 9-103(3)(a) includes vehicles, construction and farm
machinery, and shipping containers, if the goods are used as equipment, see U.C.C.
§ 9-109 (1972 version), or as inventory for lease, see id. § 9-103(3)(a). In contrast, an
inventory of such items held for sale will be ordinary goods, perfected where they are
located under § 9-103(1). Clearly, borderline cases exist as to whether goods are mobile
or ordinary and may call for perfection by filing in more than one jurisdiction to prevent
loss of the security interest.
205. If the debtor has more than one place of business, § 9-103(3)(d) deems his chief
executive office as the place of business. Under the 1962 Text the location of intangibles
is referred to as "the chief place of business." WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-103(2) (1979).
Collectively, all of these locations relate to a domicile rule as the location for intangibles.
Section 9-103(3)(c) contains rules, as does § 9-103(2) and (5) of the 1962 Text, for perfecting a security interest in intangibles if the debtor is a foreign domiciliary.
206. U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(d) (1972 version).
207. Id. § 9-103(3)(b).
208. Id. § 9-103(3)(e). This provision remedies the omission of rules for change of the
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Mention has already been made of perfection of liens in
goods (primarily automobiles, other highway vehicles, mobile
homes, and boats) subject to certificate of title laws."" Subsections 9-302(3) and (4) of the 1972 Text recognize that perfection
by entry of the lien on the certificate of title in accordance with
the applicable title statute is both necessary and sufficient for
perfection of the lien under the Code, unless the collateral is in a
dealer's inventory for sale.10
Subsection 9-103(2) governs the interstate movement of
goods subject to certificate of title statutes. The basic rules
incorporated into the 1972 Text are simple. When goods subject
to an outstanding certificate of title are moved into a U.C.C.
jurisdiction, a lien entered on the certificate of title from the first
jurisdiction remains perfected at least until a new certificate of
title is issued in the second jurisdiction. If the lien is entered on
the second jurisdiction's certificate of title, perfection of the
security interest continues without interruption in the second
state. If, on the other hand, the debtor procures (whether by
fraud or by accident) a "clean" certificate of title not showing
the lien, perfection of the security interest from the first jurisdiction nonetheless continues in the second jurisdiction until four
months have elapsed after the goods entered the second
jurisdiction."'
If goods subject to a properly perfected security interest in a
jurisdiction in which no certificate of title is outstanding (as
would be'the case for automobiles registered before a certificate
of title statute was enacted and in which a lien would be perfected by filing under the Code)2 1" are moved by the debtor into a
second jurisdiction where a certificate of title not showing the
lien is procured, perfection continues in the second jurisdiction
for four months.2 1 3
debtor's location in the case of intangible collateral and mobile goods in § 9-103(1) and (2)
of the 1962 Text and clarifies that a grace period of automatic perfection will be accorded
in the new jurisdiction. As in the case of goods subject to a title certificate, it is possible
to infer from the language of § 9-103 of the 1962 Text that no grace period is permitted,
with the consequence that a change in location without an immediate filing in the new
jurisdiction will result in lapse of perfection.
209. See text accompanying notes 98-100 supra.
210. U.C.C. § 9-302(3)(b) (1972 version).
211. Id. § 9-103(2)(b). If the new certificate is procured more than four months after
the goods entered the second jurisdiction, the perfection of the security interest from the
first jurisdiction obviously lapses immediately on the issuance of the clean certificate.
212. Id. § 9-302(I)(d).
213. Id. § 9-103(2)(c).
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Simple as they may seem, these two rules resolve issues
repeatedly litigated under the 1962 Text of subsections 9-103(3)
and (4). In two Washington cases the courts have adopted the
majority position, which also corresponds with the resolution in
the 1972 Text. In the first case, Morris v. Seattle-First National
Bank,"' decided by the court of appeals without reference to the
1972 Text, a certificate of title procured in Washington after the
automobile involved had left Texas failed to show a lien that was
entered on the face of the Texas title certificate. Upon repossession by an agent of the Texas secured party within four months
after the car left Texas, a professional auto buyer, GM Auto
Sales, was held to be subject to the lien of the Texas financier
pursuant to subsection 9-103(3) of the 1962 Text.
v. Brune,2 '
In the later case, Associates Realty Credit Ltd.
a mobile home not subject to title certificate laws in British
Columbia was subject to a properly perfected security interest.
The mobile home was moved to Washington where a title certificate not showing the British Columbia lien was procured. The
clean certificate was used by the owners to obtain a secured loan
from a professional lender, which had its lien properly entered on
the certificate. Within four months of the mobile home's arrival in
Washington, the Canadian creditor located the mobile home and
sued to foreclose its mortgage, claiming priority over the Washington lender. In holding for the Canadian secured party, the
supreme court interpreted subsection 9-103(4) of the 1962 Text,
governing perfection of liens on title certificate property, as subject to the provisions of subsection 9-103(3) of the 1962 Text,
which grants a four-month automatic perfection in Washington
for liens perfected elsewhere. Significantly, the Washington court
9-103(2) of the 1972 Text
referred to the provisions of subsection
6
2 1
interpretation.
its
for
as a basis
The rules of subsection 9-103(2) of the 1972 Text, codifying
Morris and Brune, are only two of a number of instances in
214. 10 Wash. App. 129, 516 P.2d 1055 (1973). The court explained how the debtor
was able to launder title through the medium of a New York title certificate issued under
a law not requiring liens to be recorded on the face of the certificate. As previously mentioned, by 1978 every state had enacted laws requiring entry of liens on the face of any
newly issued title on an automobile. See note 98 supra.
215. 89 Wash. 2d 6, 568 P.2d 787 (1977).
216. Id. at 13 n.3, 568 P.2d at 791 n.3. The Washington Supreme Court has taken
judicial notice of 1972 Text clarifications of imperfections in the 1962 Text on one other
occasion. See General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Isaacs, 90 Wash. 2d 234, 243 n.5, 581 P.2d
1032, 1037 n.5 (1978). See also U.C.C. § 11-108 (1972 version).
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which parties dealing with the debtor are required under the
1962 and 1972 Texts to bear the risk2"7 of perfected, but not readily discoverable,"' liens on the collateral. Financiers and dealers
should understand the rules governing possible existence of such
liens on the property in which they trade and either investigate
or assume the risk in the transactions they undertake. The drafters of the 1972 amendments, however, did not believe that nonprofessional buyers of used cars and trucks can fairly be held to
anticipate interests not on the face of the certificate, much the
same as consumer buyers are not expected to investigate for
unfiled interests in goods they purchase. Thus, the provisions of
subsection 9-103(2) of the 1972 Text are subject to an exception
in favor of a "non-professional buyer"2 9 who pays value in reliance on a clean certificate issued notwithstanding the existence
of a perfected lien from another jurisdiction. Pursuant to subsection 9-103(2)(d), purchase by such a buyer terminates the
unlisted lien, notwithstanding that its four-month period of
automatic perfection has not ended. 0
VIII.

DEFAULT AND ENFORCEMENT

A.

Defining Default

Because Article 9 does not define default, the secured
party's attorney must carefully set forth in the security agree217. Other examples, already provided for in the 1962 Text and carried forward,
include the temporary automatic perfection granted on change of the collateral's location
under other provisions of § 9-103; the automatic temporary perfection in instruments and
negotiable documents under § 9-304(4) and (5); and the automatic perfection of purchase
money security interests in consumer goods under § 9-302(1)(d). Additionally, § 9-402(7)
of the 1972 Text provides for temporary automatic perfection after a debtor's name
change and continuing perfection upon transfer of collateral by a debtor to a third party,
and § 10-102(2) provides for post-U.C.C. perfection of perfected pre-Code interests. See
note 148 supra.
218. "Not readily discoverable" means undiscoverable by a record search under the
current name of the person known to be the owner of the property in question in the
jurisdiction where either the debtor or the goods are located.
219. The term "non-professional buyer" is broader than the term "consumer," and
the provision of § 9-103(2)(d) is broader than a consumer protection statute. Nevertheless, it is analogous to § 9-307(2), which grants priority to a consumer buyer over an
unfiled purchase money consumer goods interest, presumably because of the average consumer's unfamiliarity with the expectations of the business community.
220. Decisions under § 9-103(3) and (4) of the 1962 Text, relating to continuing automatic perfection of a lien not shown on the face of a new title certificate, have both
upheld and rejected continued perfection. See Associates Realty Credit Ltd. v. Brune, 98
Wash. 2d 6, 568 P.2d 757 (1977); Norris v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 10 Wash. App. 129,
516 P.2d 1055 (1973).
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ment the debtor's obligations.22 ' Resort to "boilerplate" clauses
is unwise; the attorney must prepare a definition of default for
inclusion in the agreement which is appropriate to the particular
transaction. Section 1-208 of the Code expressly permits the use
of an "acceleration clause" empowering the secured party to
demand immediate repayment of his advance if he "in good
faith believes that the prospect of payment or performance 22is2
impaired." Language to this effect should always be included.
If the advance is not repaid at once, acceleration will place the
debtor in default and allow the secured party to collect the whole
balance, not just the unpaid installment.
B.

1972 Amendments to Part Five

Part 5 of Article 9223 governs both the secured party's rights
after default in collecting the balance and the debtor's rights,
both before and after default, against overreaching. 22 Changes in
221. Prompt payment is not the only important consideration; other obligations
creditors routinely require are that the collateral be kept clear of conflicting liens, that
the collateral and records concerning it be kept available for inspection, and that the
collateral be insured and maintained in good repair. Breach of any of these obligations
would constitute default.
222. Because of variation in the Washington Text of § 1-208 from the Official Text,
acceleration clauses should only be used cautiously. Pre-Code Washington law recognized
the validity of such acceleration clauses; the Washington rule was that the creditor must
have "reasonable cause to deem [himself] insecure," before exercising his rights. Jacobson v. McClanahan, 43 Wash. 2d 751, 754, 264 P.2d 253, 255 (1953). The Washington
Text omits the second sentence of the Official Text of § 1-208, which places on the debtor
the burden of proving the secured party is not acting in good faith. Consequently, the
burden of proving a good faith belief in diminished prospects of repayment rests on the
accelerating creditor. See Article One-General Provisions, in COLLECTED ESSAYS ON THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE IN WASHINGTON 20 (1967).
223. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 62A.9-501 to .9-507 (1979).
224. Washington has enacted a second paragraph to § 9-501(1). Id. § 62A.9-501(1);
see text accompanying notes 226-38 infra. This paragraph prohibits a deficiency judgment after repossession of the collateral in cases of purchase money security interests in
consumer goods. Also, § 9-501(3) prohibits waiver of specific debtor's rights granted by
Part 5, including the right to any surplus on collection of intangible collateral under
§ 9-502 or disposition of tangible collateral under § 9-504, and the right to damages for
creditor misconduct under § 9-507(1). In addition, § 9-501(3), in conjunction with §§ 9-504,
9-505, and 9-506, forbids the waiver prior to default of the debtor's right to notice of sale or
other disposition under § 9-504(3), the creditor's intention to retain the collateral under
§ 9-505(2), the right to require disposition of the collateral if he believes sale will produce a
surplus under § 9-505, and the right to redeem under § 9-506.
Sections 9-504(3) and 9-505(2) are amended by the 1972 Text expressly to authorize
the debtor's post-default waiver of the right to notice of sale and to notice of strict foreclosure. Validity of post-default waiver under the 1962 Text is denied by court decision in
some states. See, e.g., Hall v. Owen County State Bank, - Ind. App. -, 370 N.E.2d 918
(1977).
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Part 5 from the present Washington Text to the 1972 Official
Text are minimal. Other than technical amendments to section
9-502, subsections 9-501(3), and 9-504(1) and (2), only subsections 9-504(3) and 9-505(2) would be affected. Under the 1962
Text a creditor in possession of the collateral after default must
send notification to the debtor of sale under subsection 9-504(3)
or of his intention to retain the collateral under subsection
9-505(2). Also, except in the case of consumer goods, such notice
must be sent to "any other person who has a security interest
in the collateral and who has duly filed a financing statement
indexed in the name of the debtor in this state or who is known
by the secured party to have a security interest in the collateral." 21 5 Compliance with this provision requires a U.C.C. record
search. To eliminate this expense, as well as to foreclose the possibility that an off-record interest might exist of which the
secured party allegedly had knowledge, the 1972 Text requires
that notice be sent only to such other secured creditors as have
given the secured party timely notice of their interests in the collateral. The basis for the changes is that junior secured creditors
will only be interested in the fate of the collateral if they anticipate that a surplus over the senior secured party's claim would
be realized on sale. In practice, this does not often happen, but if
it appears that it may, junior parties are assumed to be aware of
the possibility. The new provision merely requires their affirmative action to safeguard their interests. Both subsections 9-504(3)
and 9-505(2) have also been modified explicitly to provide that
the debtor may waive after default his rights to notice of sale
and to object to the secured party's retention of the collateral.
C.

Cumulation of and Limitations on Remedies

The interests of debtor and creditor collide most sharply in
Part 5 of Article 9. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that nearly
half of all reported Washington Article 9 cases during the first
twelve years of the Code dealt with allegations of creditor violation of the provisions of Part 5. A review of the provisions of Part
5 in light of cases interpreting the Washington Code is appropriate because of the significance of the provisions to a creditor
faced with enforcing his interest after default.
The only nonuniform language in Part 5 of the Washington
Text is the second paragraph of subsection 9-501(1), reading as
225. WASH. REv. CODE § 62A.9-504(3) (1979).
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follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Code, in the case
of a purchase money security interest in consumer goods taken
or retained by the seller of such collateral to secure all or part
of its price, the debtor shall not be liable for any deficiency
after the secured party has disposed of such collateral under
RCW 62A.9-504 or has retained such collateral in satisfaction
22
of the debt under subsection (2) of RCW 62A.9-505. '
Two technical problems in the drafting are immediately obvious:
(1) the statute does not indicate at what point in time the goods
must be consumer goods for the rule to apply, and (2) the statute refers only to a purchase money interest "taken or retained
by the seller," despite section 9-107's extension of the concept of
purchase money financing to include a person "who by making
advances or incurring an obligation gives value to enable the
debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral .

.

.

."

The

first problem was resolved by the Washington Supreme Court in
Commercial Credit Equipment Corp. v. Carter,2 1 in which the
court held that the initial use, or intended use as communicated
to the seller, controls the classifications of the goods for purposes
of subsection 9-501(1), notwithstanding a subsequent change in
2
use. 2
The second problem has not been litigated; in both cases
in which interpretation of the second paragraph of subsection
9-501(1) has been required, the security interest appears to have
been retained by the seller and thereafter assigned to a professional financier.2 Under pre-Code law a conditional sale could
only be created by agreement between the vendor and vendee; 2 0
a third-party financier advancing the purchase price would have
received a chattel mortgage. Presumably, the drafters did not
intentionally create a dichotomy of treatment between the two
226. Id. § 62A.9-501(1).
227. 83 Wash. 2d 136, 516 P.2d 767 (1973).

228. Id. at 139, 516 P.2d at 769. The buyer acquired a $24,000 airplane for his private use, and when he was unable to make the payments, he began, with the approval of

the secured party, to rent the plane in an effort to make sufficient money to meet his
obligation. By the time it was repossessed, the number of hours the plane had been flown
in a rental capacity exceeded those flown in a private, or personal use, capacity. The
court also rejected the proposition, advanced by the trial court, that consumer goods
should be restricted to nonluxury items.
229. In Carter, this fact is stated explicitly; in Lew v. Goodfellow Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 6 Wash. App. 266, 492 P.2d 258 (1971), it is implied in the court's description
of the financing arrangements.

230. Ch. 106, 1893 Wash. Laws 253 (repealed 1965).
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types of purchase money interests provided for in the Code, and
it would appear that the provision should be amended by deleting the language "taken or retained by the seller of such collateral to secure all or part of its price" at the time the 1972
amendments are considered, so that the provision would read:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Code, in the case
of a purchase money security interest in consumer goods, the
debtor shall not be liable for any deficiency after the secured
party has disposed of such collateral under RCW 62A.9-504 or
has retained such collateral in satisfaction of the debt under
subsection (2) of RCW 62A.9-505.
A third and more significant question of the second paragraph of subsection 9-501(1) is whether the legislature intended
the provision to prohibit recovery from a consumer debtor of any
amount in excess of the value of the collateral or merely to deny
a deficiency judgment only in those cases in which the creditor
undertakes to repossess first. The Washington Court of Appeals
addressed this question in Lew v. Goodfellow ChryslerPlymouth, Inc.,Z31 one of the earliest Washington Code cases. Mr.
Lew's new car disappeared from the dealer's service lot while in
the dealer's custody and was found abandoned several months
later by the police. Lew refused to accept return of his damaged
car, despite a tender of the amount alleged by the dealer to
represent his costs and also refused to make further payments
under the sales and security agreement which he had signed. In a
multiparty suit the trial court entered judgment on behalf of the
secured creditor for the deficiency remaining after foreclosure and
sheriff's sale of the car. 23 As held by the trial court, the creditor's
refusal to accept possession of the car prior to initiating its
foreclosure action on the lien removed its subsequent deficiency
action from the bar of section 9-501(1). The court of appeals cited
with approval the analysis of Professors Shattuck and Cosway2
that a deficiency judgment is not prohibited by subsection 9501(1) if the creditor immediately resorts to suit and eschews
repossession.
Clearly, the court's interpretation of the effect of the
231. 6 Wash. App. 226, 492 P.2d 258 (1971).
232. From the appellate opinion it appears that Lew was in fact insulated from liability for the unpaid balance by a judgment over against Goodfellow as the negligent
party in the theft. Id. at 228-29, 492 P.2d at 260.
233. Id. at 231, 492 P.2d at 262 (quoting 8 WASH. PRACTrCE § 9:1270(5), at 210
(1967)).
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nonuniform second paragraph of subsection 9-501(1) iscorrect.
As the Washington Comments2 3' to section 9-501 point out, the
second paragraph is a continuation, in the case of consumer
purchases only, of prior Washington practice under the conditional sales statute,23 5 which forced the seller to elect either to
23
repossess or to sue for the balance due on the contract. Under
prior Washington law, the seller, upon electing to sue, could
enforce his judgment by levy on any property of the debtor,
7
including the property sold.2 The only change from prior law,
therefore, would appear to be that the purchase money financier,
by bringing suit, does not lose his original priority in the collat2
eral created by the security interest lien. 3 This change is relevant, however, only with respect to his priority in the collateral
against intervening lien creditors of the debtor, including a trustee in bankruptcy, and does not affect the debtor-secured party
relationship.
In addition, section 5.103 of the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code (U.C.C.C.), 239 not adopted in Washington, but in force in
at least eleven states, restricts a purchase money financier of
240
to a similar
consumer goods with a cash price of $1750 or less
section
The
contract.
the
on
sue
to
or
election to repossess
way to
any
in
attempting
explicitly prohibits the creditor from
of
subject
realize his judgment out of the collateral that was the
24
the sale. In their comments the drafters state that "the rights
of the creditor and consumer are controlled by Part 5 (Default)
of U.C.C. Article 9, except to the extent that such rights are
changed by this Act. ' ' 24 2 Based on the specific prohibition of
resort to the collateral in U.C.C.C. subsection 5.103(7), the
234. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. tit. 62A (1976) contains Washington comments prepared as an aid to Washington practice.
235. Ch. 106, 1893 Wash. Laws 253 (repealed 1965).
236. See, e.g., Washington Co-op. Chick Ass'n v. Jacobs, 42 Wash. 2d 460, 256 P.2d
294 (1953).
237. Standard Fin. Co. v. Townsend, 1 Wash. 2d 274, 276, 95 P.2d 786, 788 (1939).

238. Section 9-501(5) provides that a levy on the collateral after the secured party

reduces his claim to judgment shall relate back to the date of the security interest's origi-

nal perfection. Under prior law, the effect of a conditional seller suing to enforce the
contract was to make the sale absolute, thus terminating his originally retained rights in

the collateral, as well as his priority over other creditors who might levy on the collateral
before the seller could do so.
239. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.103 (1974 version).

240. One thousand dollars or less in the 1968 Official Text of the U.C.C.C. Id.
(1968 version).
241. Id. § 5.103(7) (1974 version).
242. Id. § 5.103, Official Comment 1 (emphasis added).
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Washington Court of Appeals correctly interpreted subsection
9-501(1) to permit the creditor to foreclose on the collateral after
judgment. But, even though a secured party holding a purchase
money interest in consumer goods may foreclose on the collateral
after suing on the contract, the secured party must still determine whether the possibility of collecting a deficiency judgment
against the consumer outweighs the risk of total loss or further
depreciation in value of the collateral should he fail to repossess
immediately on default.
Except as limited in the case of a purchase money security
interest in consumer goods, subsection 9-501(1) expressly provides that the secured party's remedies are cumulative, as the
Washington Supreme Court has twice confirmed. In the earlier
case the supreme court affirmed a court of appeals decision13
that a secured party may repossess his collateral and at the same
time initiate suit for deficiency, in contrast to Washington preCode conditional sale and chattel mortgage law.2 4 ' The court also
upheld the secured party's right to cancel a planned sale under
section 9-504 and proceed instead to foreclosure and sheriff's
sale.2 45 In the second case the supreme court upheld the right of a
seller of corporate stock, upon default in the purchase agreement, to a deficiency judgment following a public sale of the
stock pledged to secure the buyer's performance.2 41
D. Secured Party Self-Help
Two sections, 9-502 and 9-503, specifically authorize the
secured party's resort to collateral without obtaining prior judg243. Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Peterson, 7 Wash. App. 196, 498 P.2d 884, aff'd, 82
Wash. 2d 822, 514 P.2d 159 (1973).
244. The election of remedies under the Conditional Sales Act has been mentioned.
See text accompanying note 236 supra. Under the chattel mortgage statute the mortgagee
had no alternative but to foreclose. Roche Fruit & Produce Co. v. Vaught, 143 Wash. 601,
255 P. 953 (1927).
245. The court of appeals observed that the creditor can change his method of realization as long as no injury, such as further depreciation to the property, befalls the
debtor. 7 Wash. App. at 199 n.2, 498 P.2d at 886 n.2. The supreme court specifically
pointed to the debtor's right to object to the secured party's method of realizing on the
collateral granted in § 9-507(1)(lst sent.), noting that no such objection was made prior
to trial. 82 Wash. 2d at 831, 514 P.2d at 165.
246. Foster v. Knutson, 84 Wash. 2d 538, 527 P.2d 1108 (1974). In a third and more
recent case in which the issue of cumulative remedies was not specifically raised, the
supreme court nevertheless upheld the secured party's right to repossess some of the collateral and, even prior to sale, bring an action for deficiency and judicial foreclosure on
collateral that had not been seized. Borg-Warner Accept. Corp. v. Scott, 86 Wash. 2d
276, 543 P.2d 638 (1975).
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ment against the debtor. Pursuant to section 9-502, on default
the secured party may collect the proceeds of intangible collateral directly from the account debtors and apply them in satis7
faction of the defaulted obligation;" under section 9-503, the
secured party has an immediate right to take possession of tangible collateral, "if such can be done without breach of the
peace." 248 No Washington appellate cases have discussed section
9-502, but section 9-503, perhaps predictably, is at the eye of the
hurricane. Three major issues involving section 9-503 have been
litigated: (1) the constitutional validity of self-help repossession
prior to judgment, (2) the effect of third-party interests on the
secured party's right of repossession, and (3) the meaning of
breach of the peace.
2 9
In Faircloth v. Old National Bank of Washington, and
again two months later in Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v.
Scott,2 510 the Washington Supreme Court unanimously joined the
large number of state and federal courts upholding the constitutionality of section 9-503 against allegations that the legislative
sanction of self-help repossession in section 9-503 constitutes
state interference in the debtor's property without due process of
law.251
247. Agreements for purchase of, or for lending against, intangibles must carefully
detail whether the transaction is a sale or a loan, as well as whether the debtor is liable
for a deficiency or entitled to a surplus. Specification of these terms is important not only
to determine the parties' rights on default under § 9-502, but also to answer other questions involving the agreement. For example, the court of appeals has held that the discount on a sale of accounts, as opposed to the interest on borrowing against accounts, is
not subject to the Washington usury statutes. Schmitt v. Matthews, 12 Wash. App. 654,
531 P.2d 309 (1975). In addition, because § 9-502 merely requires the creditor to proceed
with his collections "in a commercially reasonable manner," standards for collection
should also be set out in the agreement to minimize the possibility of later disagreement.
248. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-503 (1979).
249. 86 Wash. 2d 1, 541 P.2d 362 (1975).
250. 86 Wash. 2d 276, 543 P.2d 638 (1975).
251. See, e.g., Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974). Numerous additional citations to cases and law
review articles are given by the supreme court in the course of the Faircloth and Scott
decisions. The arguments to invalidate § 9-503 are well known. See Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Co., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (prejudgment
seizure of the property of defendant in a lawsuit may occur only after judicial inquiry into
the probable likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits). The recovery of possession by a secured party has been held to be a private remedy, sanctioned either by
contract or by common law, and not, therefore, a matter of state action. Cf. Flagg Bros.
v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (upheld against a due process attack § 7-210, which
allows a sale, without a prior court hearing, under a warehouseman's lien for storage
charges). In a later decision sustaining nonjudicial mortgage foreclosure, the Washington
Supreme Court cited its Faircloth decision with approval. Kennebec, Inc. v. Bank of the

19791

U. C. C. 1972 Amendments

Although section 9-503 itself is silent, the common law
clearly establishes the right of repossession only against the
debtor and creditors whose claims in the collateral are subordinate to those of the party repossessing.1 ' As the court of appeals
recently held in Barnett v. Everett Trust & Savings Bank,2 = interference with rights to possession and sale belonging to a creditor
senior to the party repossessing constitutes conversion of the
senior creditor's interest in the property. The junior creditor repossessed restaurant equipment upon default under a security
agreement entered into with the purchasers of the restaurant
under a pre-Code conditional sale. The conditional sellers, whose
interest had been property recorded under pre-Code law and
whose rights were preserved by virtue of that filing without the
need for refiling pursuant to subsection 10-102(2), had declared a
default and foreclosed in superior court at approximately the
same time the bank repossessed. 5 ' Relying on Washington preCode law, the court upheld judgment for the conditional sellers
against the junior secured party in an amount equal to the loss
in value suffered by the collateral upon its removal by the junior
party from the restaurant premises. That the senior lien arose
under prior law is incidental to the thrust of the decision: rights
of junior lien holders to repossess will be terminated by the
senior secured party's declaration of default.2 55
West, 88 Wash. 2d 718, 721, 565 P.2d 812, 814 (1977). The court of appeals has also
rejected a debtor's attack on § 9-503. Mount Vernon Dodge, Inc. v. Seattle-First Nat'l
Bank, 18 Wash. App. 569, 570 P.2d 702 (1977).
252. Section 9-504 implicitly recognizes that the right of repossession belongs only to
the senior lien on the collateral by its references in subsections (1) and (4) to the rights
(or lack thereof) of creditors junior to the selling creditor and by its omission of reference
to rights of creditors senior to the selling creditor.
253. 13 Wash. App. 332, 534 P.2d 836 (1975).
254. The bank's repossession in the face of the perfected earlier interest can be
accounted for by the fact that perfection of the prior interest was by filing with the
county auditor under the former Conditional Sales Act (originally enacted ch. 106, 1893
Wash. Laws 253) (repealed 1965) (repeal effective 1967). The bank officials and their
legal counsel apparently failed to consider the possible existence of a valid pre-Code
interest not shown in a U.C.C. record check. The circumstances of this case emphasize
the need to determine whether any valid interests not revealed by a check of the U.CC.
filings may exist. Other circumstances are out-of-state perfection preserved under
§ 9-10t: and those circumstances covered in § 9-402(7) of the 1972 Text. See notes 148
& 217 supra. Although the U.C.C. has been in effect in Washington since July 1. 1967.
and the possibility of pre-Code interests therefore diminishes with time. § 10-102(2)
preserves the perfection of pre-Code interests indefinitely: further, the provision for perfecting pre-Code conditional sales contracts by local filing provides for no termination
of perfection for a properly filed conditional sale contract until full payment has been
made. See ch. 106. § 2, 1893 Wash. Laws 253 (repealed 1965).
255. Cf. Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164 (1971) (judicial creditor's
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Neither section 9-503 nor any other provision of the Code
contains a definition of breach of the peace. Pre-Code Washington conditional sales cases, however, recognized necessary limits
on the seller's right of repossession. When supplemented by
numerous cases from other jurisdictions, " ' these Washington
cases make it clear that a creditor may not use force "7 or intimidation ' to recover collateral over the objections of a debtor who
is at the scene. The rule is also clear that a secured party may
not enter a locked dwelling.2 5 Nevertheless, he may take without permission a locked car or other object left outside on the
debtor's premises.26 Case law clearly extends less protection to
the debtor against a secured party's unauthorized invasion of
power to
business premises, but the extent of the secured party's
2
recover collateral from a business debtor is uncertain. 61
levy upon, and sale of, judgment debtor's interest in property subject to U.C.C. security
interest held to be conversion of secured party's rights in the property).
256. For an annotation of cases discussing breach of peace in the context of creditor
repossession, see Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 358 (1965).
257. In the often-cited case, Burgin v. Universal Credit Co., 2 Wash. 2d 364, 98 P.2d
291 (1940), the Washington Supreme Court approved a jury instruction which read in
part:
[11f the buyer is in personal possession of the [collateral] and protests against
such repossession and attempts to obstruct the seller in doing so, then under such
circumstances, it becomes the duty of the seller to proceed no further in such
attempted repossession and to resort to legal process to enforce his right of
repossession given him by the contract. Under such contract the seller is not
entitled to use force to repossess [the collateral], and if he does, and in so doing,
inflicts personal injuries upon the purchaser or party in lawful possession of the
same, he is liable in damages for such injuries.
Id. at 373, 98 P.2d at 295.
258. In Stone Mach. Co. v. Kessler, 1 Wash. App. 750, 463 P.2d 651 (1970), a seller
repossessed in Oregon a bulldozer sold in Washington. Since the buyer had previously
told the seller that he would not allow a repossession without judicial process, the seller
had the local Oregon sheriff, uniformed and armed, accompany him to where the defendant was working with the machine. The sheriff ordered the defendant to permit the
repossession, although he admitted he had no legal papers. The defendant stood aside,
testifying later that he did not resist because he did not believe he could disregard the
sheriff's order.
The court of appeals upheld a judgment for the debtor based on conversion.
Although the propriety of the repossession was decided under Oregon law, OR. REV. STAT.
§ 79.5030 (1977), nothing indicates the result would have been different under Washington law. The court cited Burgin and other Washington cases to support the debtor's right
to resist nonjudicial repossession.
259. Cases abound from other jurisdictions holding entry into a house or locked
garage to be a breach of the peace. See, e.g., Girard v. Anderson, 219 Iowa 142, 257 N.W.
400 (1934).
260. See, e.g., Gregory v. First Nat'l Bank, 241 Or. 397, 406 P.2d 156 (1965); Pioneer
Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. Adams, 426 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
261. See, e.g., Borg-Warner Accept. Corp. v. Scott, 86 Wash. 2d 276, 543 P.2d 638
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The most recent U.C.C. case decided by the Washington
Supreme Court involving a disputed repossession is Borg-Warner
22 In
Acceptance Corp. V. Scott.1
Scott, two agents for the creditor
recovered equipment by diverting the debtor's attention while
another two rolled the collateral out of his business premises and
into a waiting truck. Holding that the debtor had failed to prove
any damages as a result of the repossession,2 6 3 the court failed to
rule whether the repossession was a breach of the peace. Under
the facts stated by the supreme court, however, one can, based
on factors present in cases from other jurisdictions, predict that
the supreme court would have upheld the trial court's ruling that
the repossession was lawful. The entry was made during business
hours into the service area of a car repair shop and the goods
were removed without objection from the debtor or third parties.2 4 Moreover, to avoid confrontation, the creditor's agents left
as soon as challenged.
If the secured party cannot peaceably repossess the collateral, then his only resort in enforcing the security interest is to
the courts, either in foreclosure on the lien or in suit on the
underlying debt. 2 5 Should he choose to do so, he can obtain a
judgment for the entire sum due him and have immediate execution, not only on the collateral, but also, if the collateral is insufficient to cover the judgment, on so much of the rest of the
debtor's property as is necessary to cover the deficiency. The
debtor's refusal to relinquish the collateral peaceably does not
affect the secured party's property rights in the collateral, and in
(1975). Compare Cherno v. Bank of Babylon, 54 Misc. 2d 277, 282 N.Y.S.2d 114 (Sup.
Ct. 1967), a/f'd, 29 A.D.2d 767, 288 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1968) (creditor entry into locked business premises using landlord's key and with his permission not a breach of peace) with
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Smithey, 426 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (unauthorized entry
into locked gas station by picking the lock held a breach of the peace).
262. 86 Wash. 2d 276, 543 P.2d 638 (1975).
263. Id. at 279, 543 P.2d at 641. The debtor did not assert commission of a tort on
his person or conversion of his equity in the property. Cf. Stone Mach. Co. v. Kessler, 1
Wash. App. 750, 463 P.2d 651 (1970) (upholding award to debtor of damages measured
by the difference between debtor's total payments and fair market value of collateral). In
fact, the court found he made no attempt to show any equity existed. 86 Wash. 2d at 280,
543 P.2d at 641. Rather, the injury alleged was for loss of the collateral's use from the
date of repossession to trial. While intimating that an action for loss of use might lie in
favor of a defaulting debtor, the court dismissed the debtor's claim on the basis that he
had not attempted to show any damages as a result of the loss of possession. Id. at 281,
543 P.2d at 642.
264. Other cases have permitted entry into open private premises. See, e.g., Marine
Midland Bank-Cent. v. Cote, 351 So. 2d 750 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (open carport);
Kroeger v. Ogsden, 429 P.2d 781 (Okla. 1967) (open airplane hangar at public airport).
265. See WASH. REv. CODE § 62A.9-501(5) (1979).
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measuring the secured party's rights against third-party claimants to the collateral, the lien on execution relates back to the
original date of perfection of the security interest."'
E.

Satisfaction by Sale or Otherwise

The secured party who has succeeded in repossessing his collateral may elect, except in one instance," 7 either to dispose of
the collateral under section 9-504 or to retain it in full satisfaction of the debtor's obligations under section 9-505(2) (so-called
"strict foreclosure"). If the secured party elects to dispose of the
collateral by sale or otherwise,16 the proceeds are used to satisfy
the amount due the secured party, as well as the party's costs of
sale and reasonable attorney's fees if provided for in the agreement. 2 9 If the proceeds are greater than the amount due the
secured party plus costs and recoverable attorney's fees, the
excess either will be made available to holders of subordinate
interests in the collateral, if there are any who have notified the
20
secured party of their claims, or will be returned to the debtor.
If the proceeds are less than the amount due, however, the
secured party is entitled to sue the debtor for the deficiency
under subsection 9-504(2) and to execute on the debtor's other
property after obtaining judgment. A good faith purchaser will
take the collateral free of all rights of the debtor, of the secured
party, and of any lien creditors whose claims are subordinate to
the secured party,"' a provision necessary to insure that a fair
price for the collateral can be achieved. Junior secured parties
must realize their claims either out of the remaining proceeds of
sale or out of the debtor's other property.
266. Id.
267. This instance, provided for in § 9-505(1), arises when a consumer has paid more
than 60% of an indebtedness secured by consumer goods. In such a case the secured party
must sell the collateral unless the debtor renounces his rights after default. Section
9-507(1I(3d sent.) provides for the award of minimum statutory damages should a secured party fail to comply with the sale requirement of § 9-505(1) and the debtor's actual
damages do not exceed the statutory minimum.
268. Section 9-504(1) states that the secured party in possession of the collateral
after default may "sell, lease or otherwise dispose" of the collateral. In Grant County
Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash. App. 866, 496 P.2d 966 (1972), the court of appeals held
that a judicial determination of the value of collateral constituted a disposition for purposes of entry of a deficiency judgment, even if the creditor had not yet sold the property
at the moment judgment was entered. Id. at 870, 496 P.2d at 969. Because disposition
normally will be by sale, this article will refer to the disposition as a sale.
269. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-504(1)(a)-(b) (1979).
270. Id. § 62A.9-504(1)(c)-(2).
271. Id. § 62A.9-504(4)(a)-(b).
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The Code does not prescribe how collateral must be sold.
For the protection of the debtor and the assurance of a fair
2 however,
price, m
subsection 9-504(3) establishes as a minimum
standard applicable to any disposition of collateral, by sale or
otherwise, that "every aspect of the disposition including the
method, manner, time, place and terms be commercially reasonable. '2 3 But the secured party may decide, consistent with this
standard, whether to sell by public sale (auction), 211 by private
negotiated sale, 75 or to make some other disposition of the collat272. A "fair" price, not a term of art in the Code, would be a price realized on a sale
or other disposition, all aspects of which are commercially reasonable, where the debtor
and other parties entitled to notice have been properly notified. Section 9-507(2)(lst
sent.), recognizing that a price obtained by a disposition that conforms to the requirements of § 9-504(3) nevertheless may be lower than the best price that might have been
obtained, insulates the secured party from liability in such an event.
273. Id. § 62A.9-504(3). To reduce disputes over the issue of commercial reasonableness, the Code in § 9-507(2) establishes several benchmarks of conduct that, if met,
establish a sale as commercially reasonable: (1) sale in a customary manner in a recognized market, (2) sale at the market price, or (3) sale "in conformity with reasonable
commercial practices among dealers in [that] type of property." Of course, these rules
apply only to sales of collateral having an established market and market price, such as
investment securities and automobiles; the rules offer little help to secured parties seeking to sell most varieties of used goods for which no large and established market exists.
In case of doubt, however, § 9-507(2)(4th sent.) offers the creditor one certain refuge from
attack: disposition approved by a court proceeding or by a bona fide creditors' committee
is conclusively presumed to be commercially reasonable.
274. In Foster v. Knutson, 84 Wash. 2d 538, 527 P.2d 1108 (1974), the supreme court
has further defined what standards must be met for a public sale to be commercially
reasonable when no recognized market for the collateral exists:
The sale is valid where notice of sale is (1) given to the defaulted debtor
and to the public sufficiently in advance to allow interested bidders a reasonable opportunity to participate, (2) given to a "public" reasonably expected to
have an interest in the collateral to be sold and notifying the public of the
exact time of sale and place of sale, reasonably convenient to potential bidders,
(3) sufficiently replete with information describing the collateral to be sold and
the amount of the obligation for which it is being sold to allow potential bidders a genuine opportunity to make an informed judgment as to whether to
bid at the sale, and (4) published in a manner reasonably calculated to assure
such publicity that the collateral will bring the best possible price from the
competitive bidding of a strived-for lively concourse of bidders . . . [The
secured partyl is required to use his best efforts to sell the collateral for the
highest price and to have a reasonable regard for the debtor's interests.
Id. at 549, 527 P.2d at 1114-15.
275. In Mount Vernon Dodge, Inc. v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 18 Wash. App. 569,
570 P.2d 702 (1977), the court of appeals rejected a contention that Foster v. Knutson, 84
Wash. 2d 538, 527 P.2d 1108 (1974), must be read to bar private sales under the Code.
The collateral in Mt. Vernon Dodge was new and used cars, which the court observed are
"customarily sold in a recognized market and are the subject of widely
distributed
standard price quotations." 18 Wash. App. at 586, 570 P.2d at 712. The court, noting that a
lender does not have to establish itself as a retail dealer to make a commercially reasonable

78

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 3:1

eral. In addition to a general standard of commercial reasonableness, subsection 9-504(3) specifically requires the secured party
to give reasonable notice 7 ' to the debtor and junior creditors
who have notified him of an interest in the collateral of the time
after which a private sale will be held or the time and place of a
public sale.
If the creditor violates the requirements of subsection
9-504(3), subsection 9-507(1) gives the debtor specific legal
rights both before and after the sale. If the debtor believes that
the secured party is not proceeding properly before a sale has
taken place, under subsection 9-507(1) the debtor has the right
to seek a court order to restrain the creditor's improprieties or to
supervise the sale. In the only Washington case discussing the
debtor's right to seek court intervention to correct creditor misconduct prior to sale, both the court of appeals and the supreme
court pointed to the debtor's failure to object under subsection 9-507(1) during the ten-month pendency of a foreclosure
and deficiency action as evidence that the objections raised at
trial and on appeal were not well taken. 7' 7
If a sale has taken place, the debtor and any junior creditor
entitled to receive notice of sale have a right to recover "any loss
caused by a failure [of the secured party] to comply with the
provisions of [Part 5]."27 Two Washington Court of Appeals
cases 279 have dealt with creditors' sales in which the notice
requirements of subsection 9-504(3) were not met. Both cases
held that failure to give the debtor proper notice of sale will not
sale, also approved sales of the collateral to car dealers in the wholesale market and return
of the collateral to the factory for credit. Id. at 587, 570 P.2d at 712. This last issue has been
debated in the literature but seldom decided. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 80,
§ 26--11, at 990. See also U.C.C. § 9-507, Official Comment 2 (1972 version).
276. The requirement of notice to the debtor of an impending sale cannot be waived
prior to default, WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-501(3) (1979), but the secured creditor may
define in the security agreement when notice must be sent to the debtor. If this time
period is consistent with what has been upheld by case law as reasonable, litigation
regarding sufficiency of notice may be avoided. No Washington case treating the reasonableness of the notice has been reported; in other jurisdictions cases have upheld notice
posted between 8 and 10 days prior to sale. Associate Discount Corp. v. Forcier, 5 U.C.C.
REP. SERV. 294 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968) (10 days notice); Atlas Constr. Co. v. Dravo-Doyle
Co., 3 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 124 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1965) (8 days notice).
277. Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Peterson, 7 Wash. App. 196, 199, 498 P.2d 884, 886
(1972), aff'd, 82 Wash. 2d 822, 514 P.2d 159 (1973).
278. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-507(1)(lst sent.) (1979).
279. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Wollgast, 11 Wash. App. 117, 521 P.2d 1191, pet.
rev. denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1004 (1974); Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss; 6 Wash. App.
866, 496 P.2d 966 (1972).
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bar a deficiency judgment but will permit the debtor to recover
the loss resulting from his lack of notice under subsection

9-507(1).2111 In neither case were any damages awarded, how-

ever, because no losses were established.
In the earlier case, Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 28' the
court of appeals reversed an order of the trial court denying a
deficiency because of lack of notice prior to sale with directions
for entry of a judgment in the amount of the deficiency established at trial. The opinion does not clearly state whether the
defendant debtor counterclaimed for.damages as a result of lack
of notice of sale or whether he prayed only for denial of the deficiency. In any event, no damages resulting from the lack of
notice were established at trial, all parties apparently proceeding
on the premise that the sale was commercially reasonable and
brought the highest price possible. The court of appeals, therefore, did not reach the question of who has the burden of proof on
the issue of damages in the event of sale without proper notice.
The court also appeared to rest its decision, at least in part, on a
finding that the debtor, who voluntarily returned the collateral
and gave the secured party written notice of rescission of the
underlying sale, might have waived his right to notice of sale.2' 2
In the second case, Commercial Credit Corp. v. Wollgast,2s:1
the debtor voluntarily relinquished possession to the secured
280. As the court noted in Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash. App. 866, 496
P.2d 966 (1972), there are two divergent lines of judicial authority, one denying a deficiency judgment as sanction for improper secured-party conduct in § 9-504(3), and the
other permitting a deficiency judgment, subject to the debtor's counterclaim for damages, under § 9-507(1). Id. at 869, 496 P.2d at 968-69. Representative cases in the line of
authority denying a deficiency are Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp.
696 (W.D. Pa. 1963), modified on other grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964), and Braswell v. American Nat'l Bank, 117 Ga. App. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420 (1968).
281. 6 Wash. App. 866, 496 P.2d 966 (1972).
282. Id. at 870, 496 P.2d at 969. The court cited Nelson v. Monarch Inv. Plan, Inc.,
452 S.W.2d 375 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970), as authority for this proposition. The 1962 Text of §
9-504(3) does not expressly authorize even a post-default waiver of notice of sale, and
there is a split of authority as to whether a post-default waiver is effective to release the
secured party from its obligation to give notice of sale. For an excellent discussion of the
issues, see Hall v. Owen County State Bank, - Ind. App. -, -, 370 N.E.2d 918, 924
(1977), holding that such a waiver is not permitted under the 1962 Text. The 1972 Text
of § 9-504(3) permits the debtor, after default, to sign a statement "renouncing . . . his
right to notification of sale." In any event, receipt of the debtor's written rescission or,
more properly, revocation of acceptance under § 2-608 of an underlying sales agreement
should not be the basis for advice not to send written notice of sale to the debtor in
conformity with § 9-504(3), in the absence of a specific renunciation of the right to
notice of sale.
283. 11 Wash. App. 117, 521 P.2d 1191, pet. rev. denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1004 (1974).
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party for the apparent purpose of effectuating a sale. Several
months after the repossession and about two months prior to the
sale, the secured party sent to the debtor notice that the collateral was subject to sale if the debtor did not contact the secured
party. The notice failed to include, however, the date after which
a private sale would be held. After acknowledging that insufficient notice does not bar a deficiency, the court of appeals specifically declined to follow those cases from other jurisdictions,"
creating a presumption that the collateral was worth at least the
amount remaining due and imposing upon the secured party a
burden of establishing that the debtor was not prejudiced by not
having had an opportunity to particpate in the sale. Instead, the
court concluded that the debtor had not shown any loss by the
lack of notice of sale.355
Although the collateral was sold for $300, while the amount
due at the time was approximately $1800 and the debtor in his
counterclaim asserted a retail value of over $3000, the court of
appeals upheld the trial court's finding that all aspects of the
sale were commercially reasonable. The creditor introduced evidence to show that it had sold to the highest of three bidders and
produced its employees' repossession reports as evidence of the
collateral's deteriorated condition. The creditor also established
facts tending to show the debtor abused the collateral while it
was in his possession. The debtor, on the other hand, did not
establish that he had been denied an opportunity to bid on the
collateral as a result of lack of notice, and the court suggested
that the debtor might in any case have waived his right to notice
with the understandby his voluntary surrender of the collateral
28
ing that the creditor would sell it. 1
Based on the Nuss and Woligast decisions, and in the
absence of any contrary indication from the supreme court, it
appears that if only the notice of sale is deficient and the secured
party can produce evidence to establish the sale was otherwise
commercially reasonable, then the burden is shifted to the
debtor to show that lack of notice of sale caused him any loss.
Absent proof of such loss, Washington courts will award the
secured party a judgment for the full deficiency.
284. E. ., Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538

(1i9(i(.

285. 11 Wash. App. at 124, 521 P.2d'at 1196.
286. Id. The court cited Nelson v. Monarch Inv. Plan, Inc., 452 S.W.2d 375 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1970), and Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash. App. 866, 496 P.2d 966
(1972), as authority for its conclusion.
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Neither the court of appeals nor the supreme court, however, has confronted a case in which not only was the notice of
sale inadequate but also the sale itself did not meet standards of
commercial reasonableness. In the absence of any such precedent, a federal district court in Washington has recently held
that Washington law would create a rebuttable presumption that
the collateral was actually worth the full amount due when the
unreasonable sale took place.2 87 The decision amounts, in effect,
to the denial of a deficiency judgment unless the secured party
can establish that the true value of the collateral (as contrasted
with the sale price) was actually less than the amount due at the
time of default. To the extent that he can carry this burden, a
deficiency judgment remains available despite the unreasonable
disposition. In view of the court of appeals refusal in the Nuss
and Wollgast decisions to recognize denial of a deficiency judgment as a sanction available under the Code for creditor misconduct, the federal court's prediction of Washington law is sound.
If the secured party elects strict foreclosure, he must notify
the debtor and, under the 1972 Text, those junior secured parties
who have notified him of an interest in the collateral. 2 1 If the
secured party receives no objection within the time allowed by the
statute, ' he may retain the collateral in full satisfaction of the
debtor's obligations under the security agreement. Strict
foreclosure also means that the rights of the debtor and all junior
secured parties to any excess in value of the collateral over the
value due are extinguished and that the secured party is free to
deal with the collateral as he wishes, either holding it for his own
use or selling it and keeping the proceeds. Obviously, an election
to exercise strict foreclosure will usually be made only when the
secured party either believes the collateral is worth more than
the outstanding debt or feels that further pursuit of the debtor
by seeking deficiency judgment would be fruitless. Similarly, an
objection to strict foreclosure will ordinarily be raised only when
the debtor or a junior secured party believes that the collateral
287. United States v. Cawley, 464 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Wash. 1979). The Small Business Administration (SBA), having paid off the original lender on default of an SBAguaranteed loan, sued the debtor and the personal guarantors. The SBA's agent, without
affording any notice to the debtor, disposed of the collateral without advertisement and
with very little effort to find potential buyers. The court determined that pursuant to the
Ninth Circuit's holding in United States v. MacKenzie, 510 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1975), state
law should apply to the SBA's suit against the debtor and the personal guarantors.
288. U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1972 version).
289. Thirty days under the 1962 Text, WASH. REv. CODE § 62A.9-505(2) (1979): 21
days under the 1972 Text, U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1972 version).
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would realize at a sale an excess over the secured party's claim on
sale.
Until sale, or until the secured party's election of strict foreclosure has become effective, the debtor has the right to redeem
the collateral by tendering the amount of any money then due
2 0
and performing any other obligations in default. The statute
further requires that to redeem, the debtor must pay the secured
party's expenses on default, including, if provided for in the
agreement, attorney's fees. If the debtor does redeem, the security interest is restored and continues in the collateral to secure
any unmatured obligations, or the collateral is released of the
security interest and returned to the debtor if the obligations
have been paid in full. The right to redeem is extinguished by
sale or by the secured party's effective election to retain the collateral in strict foreclosure.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The advantages to Washington in adopting the 1972 Text of
the Uniform Commercial Code are obvious: the statutory resolution of issues inadequately treated under existing law and,
equally important, the harmonization of Washington Law with
that of its neighbor and commercially significant states. Examples of existing inadequacies the 1972 Text resolves include the
proceeds problem (section 9-306, perfection, and section 9-312,
priorities); regulation of fixture interests and the interface
between real and personal property law (section 9-313); change
of name or identity of the debtor (unregulated in the 1962 Text,
section 9-402(7) of the 1972 Text); and multistate transactions
(section 9-103). Rather than leave the resolution of these and
other uncertainties to the haphazard and after-the-fact solutions
of litigation, it is far better to afford the planner of commercial
transactions the predictability a statutory resolution offers.
By demonstrating the advantages of the 1972 Text, as modified by the several proposed nonuniform amendments intended
to deal with Washington problems, the author hopes that the
legal community, particularly the Washington Bar Association,
will actively support and advocate the adoption of the 1972 Text
of the Uniform Commercial Code by the Washington Legislature
at its next regular session.
290. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-506 (1979).

